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Introduction 
 
This thesis analyses three economic aspects of mergers and acquisitions with empirical 
methods. 
The first article is jointly written with Prof. Klaus Gugler and Prof. Dennis Mueller. A 
similar version has appeared as ZEW-discussion paper number 08-076 (Mannheim) under the 
same title. In this article, some different theories about the reasons for merger waves are 
discussed and then tested by hypotheses derived from those theories. It is not possible to align 
some of the theories with the wave pattern of mergers over time and with the observation 
from several studies that mergers are on average have a negative impact on profitability. 
These patterns and other derived hypotheses, though, can be confirmed when managerial 
discretion, imperfections in the valuation on the stock market, and over-optimism are allowed 
for. 
Whereas the first article takes the observation of underperformance of merging firms 
as given, the second article takes up this issue. Other studies use comparison firms for 
merging firms often from the same country, or within a similar size group or from the same 
industries. But this article is to my knowledge the first one that implements the propensity 
score method to evaluate the effect of a merger. This is an improvement over existing studies 
as the counterfactual is clearer defined and selected with taking into account many possible 
factors and carefully balancing them. The findings are in line with other studies that mergers 
have a negative impact on firm performance, and show a tendency of even a larger negative 
effect than when traditional methods are applied. With higher negative effects being 
estimated, the theme of the first article is reinforced that merger wave explanations should 
allow for negative consequences for performance. 
Finally, in the third article, which is jointly written with Prof. Klaus Gugler, current 
economic developments are picked up to analyse the important question of merger effects 
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from a different viewpoint. The second article relies on balance sheet data for the evaluation 
of performance. In this third article, we look at stock market prices of firms as a function of 
their mergers- and acquisitions-history. For the average M&A-expense undertaken in each of 
the five years prior to the economic crisis, there is a negative influence on the share price of 
the acquiring firm during the economic crisis, which is significantly different from the drop of 
non-acquiring firms. This can be interpreted as revelation of the corporate governance 
problems often inherent in firms that make acquisitions, evaluated by the market in the 
environment of the economic crisis, when investors refocus the evaluation of firms on 
fundamental values. 
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The Determinants of Merger Waves: An International Perspective  
Co-authors: Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller 
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 Mergers have been a topic of considerable interest in the United States for at least a 
century.  Following the first great merger wave that began at the end of the 19th century, 
several studies tried to explain its causes and effects.1  An “impelling force” behind the 
mergers was “a wave of frenzied speculation in asset values” (Markham, 1955).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, therefore, the average merger during the wave proved to be unprofitable 
(Hogarty, 1970).  Subsequent US merger waves have also coincided with strong stock market 
advances, and this pattern can be regarded as a major regularity in aggregate merger data.2  
Less consensus exists over whether mergers during subsequent waves have been profitable or 
not.3 
Merger waves have also occurred in the United Kingdom.4  Outside of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and a few other Anglo-Saxon countries little research has been 
done on mergers, and essentially no studies exist on whether merger waves also occur in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries, and if so, whether their causes are the same as in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  This paper seeks to fill this void by examining merger activity in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Continental Europe over the period 1991-2004. 
While much research has been done on the causes and effects of mergers, surprisingly 
little exists on the causes of merger waves.  Recently, however, several theories have 
appeared that claim to account for merger waves.  Two of these make the standard 
assumptions of neoclassical economics – managers maximize shareholder wealth, capital 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Dewing (1921), National Industrial Conference Board (1929), Livermore (1935), and 
discussion in Markham (1955) and Hogarty (1970). 
2 Ralph Nelson (1959, 1966) was the first to document the link between merger activity and share prices, and 
numerous subsequent studies have confirmed this finding.  See, for example, Melicher, Ledolter and D’Antonio 
(1983), Geroski (1984) for the US, and Geroski (1984) and Clarke and Ioannidis (1996) for the UK. 
3  One difficulty in answering this question arises, because most studies of mergers’ effects on profits or 
shareholder wealth do not concentrate on mergers during wave years. 
4  See, Hannah and Kay (1977), Resende (1999) and Gärtner and Halbheer (2007). 
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markets are efficient.5  The other theories might best be characterized, however, as 
behavioral in that they relax one or more of these standard assumptions.6  The behavioral 
theories take into account the psychology of stock markets and, thus, give explanations for 
both why merger waves occur, and why they tend to coincide with stock market booms.   
 There is reason to expect that mergers may be less frequent in Continental Europe 
than in the United States and the United Kingdom, and that they may have different causes.  
Because of widely dispersed share ownership in the United States and the United Kingdom, a 
“market for corporate control” exists in both countries where one company can buy a 
majority of another company’s shares and merge it into itself, even if the managers of the 
target company oppose the merger.  In contrast, share ownership is much more concentrated 
in Continental Europe making it difficult for two companies to merge, if the major 
shareholders of one are opposed to the deal.  This difference between institutions in 
Continental Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries may lead to differences in both aggregate 
merger activity and its causes. 
 This article uses a natural way to discriminate between the effects of “real” changes in 
the economy, like technological advances, and the effects of pure stock market phenomena, 
like overvaluation, on merger activity, by looking at both, listed and unlisted acquirers. If real 
changes in the economy determine merger activity, as the neoclassical theories claim, we 
would expect that both types of firms are equally affected. Moreover, unlisted firms cannot 
be overvalued, at least not by the stock market, and they cannot trade their overvalued stocks 
for less overvalued stocks, as one of the behavioral theories argues.  Thus, similar patterns in 
the two types of mergers are also inconsistent with this theory.  
                                                          
5 See, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002); and Harford (2005).  Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005); and 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003).  
6 Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004); Shleifer and Vishny (2003); and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2007). 
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 We present evidence that merger waves occurred in all three areas at the end of the 
20th century – the USA, UK and Continental Europe.  These waves were almost exclusively 
confined to companies listed on stock exchanges in all three areas, which gives support to the 
behavioral hypotheses’ claim that merger waves are driven by stock market bubbles.  We 
present regression results, which offer further support for these hypotheses.   
 The plan of the article is as follows.  We first present evidence that merger waves did 
indeed occur in each of the three areas.  In Section II, we review some hypotheses, which 
claim to explain merger waves.  Section III presents regression results that are consistent with 
two behavioral theories of merger waves.  Some conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
I. The Pattern of Merger Activity, 1991-2004 
A. Data Sources 
 The information on mergers comes from “Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions,” 
produced by Thomson Financial Securities Data (TFSD).  It includes all corporate 
transactions involving at least 5 per cent of the ownership of a company with a transaction 
(deal) value of at least 1 million US dollars.  Public and private transactions are covered.  In 
total, for the period 1978 to June 2005, TFSD records 100,233 deals for the five European 
countries that we have examined:  Austria, Germany, Italy, France and United Kingdom. 
 A necessary task was to combine the transactions with the financial data available 
from the Amadeus database from Bureau van Dijk.  To this end, we applied an approximate 
string matching algorithm, matching via company names for each country.  All of the 
automatic matches below a certain similarity threshold were checked manually, amounting to 
about 24,000 deals.  We could match 52.6 per cent of all transactions to an Amadeus 
company.  Data restrictions reduce the sample available for estimation considerably (see 
Table 1 below).  Besides the financial data, we also used information on the largest 
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shareholder from Amadeus when available.  To obtain financial information for the US 
sample, we combined TFSD data with the Global Vantage database (GV).  GV contains 
financial information for listed companies. TFSD lists 193,015 US deals.  Once again, the 
number of deals we could use was to a large extent predetermined by data restrictions.  Table 
1 shows the number of deals in TFSD, the share of deals matched and the reasons for 
reducing the number of deals as originally reported in TFSD. 
 A possible difficulty in constructing our sample is that we introduce a sample 
selection bias, because we cannot match all companies that merged to the Amadeus data.  In 
particular, one worries that we might systematically under represent unlisted companies, 
because accounting data are less-readily available for them.  To determine whether such a 
bias has been introduced, we ran a probit regression to see whether the probability of a match 
was related to whether the acquirer was listed or not.  We also included in the equation the 
log of the acquirer’s total assets, ln(A), the deal value to measure the target’s size, D, a 
control variable to distinguish continental Europe from the UK, and year dummy variables.  
Ignoring the coefficients on the control variable for continental Europe and the year 
dummies, we obtained the following results (t statistics are under the coefficients): 
 πm  =   5.2·e-06D  -0.009ln(A) - 0.010List,                         n = 4,263, pseudo R2 = 0.038 
                       0.47             0.95             0.05 
The probability of a match is insignificantly related to whether an acquirer was listed or not, 
and to the sizes of both the acquirer and target company.  Our approach to matching 
companies in the two data bases does not seem to have introduced any sample selection bias. 
The reason is that Amadeus covers hundreds of thousands predominantly unlisted companies. 
 We calculate the price-earnings (P/E) ratio using GV.  The result is a single number 
for every year (1991-2004) and every country in our sample (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
UK, USA).  It was derived for all companies where data were available for a particular year 
7
on the variables “income before extraordinary items” (inc) and “market value” (mv) 
(P/E=mv/inc).  Each observation is calculated as a weighted sum of the individual P/E ratios, 
with market values as weights. 
B. Merger Patterns 
 Figures 1-3 present the numbers of completed mergers and total deal values for the 
USA, UK and Continental Europe over the period 1991 to 2004.  The numbers of mergers for 
each year are given along the left vertical axes, with total deal values along the right axes.  
Both represent the population of Mergers and Acquisitions that is included in the TFSD, i.e. 
prior to any selection for our estimation sample.  It is readily apparent that all three areas 
experienced merger waves at the end of the 1990s.7  Table 2 presents the numbers of 
domestic and cross-border mergers for the three areas.  Waves in both types of mergers are 
again readily apparent.   
 The behavioral hypotheses discussed in the next section link merger waves to the 
psychology and optimism in the stock market.  Figures 4-6 present the curves indicating the 
total deal values of acquisitions by listed and unlisted companies in each area, and weighted 
averages of company P/E ratios using company market values as weights.  The time series 
are represented as indices to ease comparison between the groups.  Once again, the deal 
values series are constructed from the TFSD population of M&A activity.  Mergers by listed 
companies peak in all three areas near the peaks of the weighted average P/E ratios.  No 
waves are visible for mergers by unlisted companies in the UK and Continental Europe, 
however, and only a small blip in acquisitions by unlisted firms occurred in the USA, and its 
peak lagged the peak for listed companies by about two years. 
                                                          
7 Gärtner and Halbheer (2007) present econometric evidence establishing that the merger activity in the USA 
and UK at the end of the 1990s was indeed a wave – that is a statistically significant surge in mergers compared 
to earlier years. 
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 That there was no wave for unlisted acquirers but only for listed acquirers is also 
evident in mean statistics.  For example, the total of deal values of acquisitions by listed firms 
increases 4-fold (USA), 4.5-fold (UK) and 6(!)-fold for Continental Europe in wave as 
compared to non-wave years.  This compares to only modest increases for unlisted firms.  
Moreover, if common shocks either to specific industries or to the whole economy were 
responsible for the observed wave pattern of merger activity, one would expect a large 
correlation between listed and unlisted firm merger activity particularly during wave years 
(since the common shock caused it).  Table 3 presents evidence to the opposite.  The 
correlation coefficients between (quarterly) listed and unlisted firm merger activity decrease 
in wave years, most markedly in the USA from 0.8 in non-wave years to 0.06 in wave years 
(UK: from 0.4 to 0.1; CE: from 0.24 to 0.2).  Thus, there is a complete decoupling of merger 
activity between listed and unlisted acquirers during waves! 
 As we shall see in the next section, these patterns are inconsistent with the predictions 
of two neoclassical theories of merger waves, but are precisely what one anticipates from the 
behavioral hypotheses. 
II. Theories of Merger Waves 
 In this section we discuss the main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain 
merger waves and whether or not they are consistent with the patterns of mergers presented 
in Section I.  In the next section, we present regression results testing the different 
hypotheses.  We first discuss two neoclassical theories of merger waves and then the 
behavioral theories. 
A. The q-Theory of Mergers 
 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) (hereafter J&R) extend the q-theory of investment to 
mergers, and claim that this extended q-theory can account for merger waves.  They liken 
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mergers to the purchase of used plant and equipment, and argue that the gap between the qs 
of potential acquiring firms and targets increases at particular points – as during a stock 
market boom – and this widening difference leads managers to favor purchasing other firms 
over used capital equipment thus creating a merger wave. 
 Under the q-theory of investment, when a firm’s return on its capital stock exceeds its 
cost of capital, q > 1, and it expands its capital stock.  A straightforward extension of the 
theory to mergers would imply that firms with qs > 1 can profitably expand by acquiring 
assets either in the form of capital investment or other firms.8  Since q measures returns on a 
firm’s existing assets, it would seem that the q-theory would only allow one to explain 
horizontal mergers, i.e., additions to existing capital stock.   
An alternative interpretation of the q-theory would be that q > 1 does not necessarily 
imply that a firm can profitably expand by acquiring more assets in its base industry, but that 
it is well managed and could profitably expand in any direction.9  Tobin’s q under this 
interpretation is not a measure of the quality of a firm’s assets, but of its management.  A 
stock market boom represents a massive revaluation of the talents of managers, which 
produces a merger wave.  
An obvious question raised by this explanation for merger waves is what caused the 
market to change its beliefs about the talents of managers?  In other work J&R (2002b) argue 
that stock market booms are caused by major technological advances like the invention of the 
automobile.  The late-1990s stock market boom was a result of innovations in information 
technology that also led to increased opportunities for profitable mergers.  Although this 
seems like a plausible explanation for both stock market booms and their accompanying 
                                                          
8 See Andrade and Stafford (2004), and Erard and Schaller (2002). 
9 See, for example, Chappell and Cheng (1984), Andrade and Stafford (2004), and Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002). 
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merger waves, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation of the q-theory to the merger 
patterns shown in Section I.  Major technological changes affect all companies in an 
economy, not just those listed on stock exchanges.  If the rise in stock prices at the end of the 
20th century reflected an increased potential for making profitable acquisitions due to 
common, underlying technological factors, then all firms, not just listed companies, should 
have experienced merger waves. This is particularly true for Continental Europe, since a 
much larger fraction of its economic activity is conducted by unlisted firms. 
Still another explanation for why qs might be related to merger waves would be that a 
general rise in market values follows some macroeconomic event, like a decrease in the 
discount rate.  Such an event could then lead to a simultaneous reevaluation of the talents of 
all managers.  If the event led to an upward reevaluation of the market values of both 
potential acquirers and targets, it would not necessarily make mergers more profitable and 
precipitate a wave, however.  In our regression work, we explicitly include a measure of 
aggregate borrowing costs. 
B. The Industry Shocks Theory 
 Where J&R’s explanation for merger waves appears to rest on an assumed, 
underlying common technological shock, Harford’s (2005) theory assumes the existence of 
numerous different shocks – some technological, some regulatory, and some taking on still 
other forms.  At certain times these shocks buffet several industries simultaneously and 
produce a merger wave across the entire economy. Harford’s “neoclassical explanation of 
merger waves” is thus vulnerable to the same criticism as the q-theory – any industry shocks 
should hit listed and unlisted firms alike and produce merger waves across both types of 
companies. 
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C. The Managerial Discretion Theory 
Under the managerial discretion theory, managers get utility from their firms’ growth either 
because their incomes are tied to growth, or because they get “psychic income” from 
managing a larger firm.10  The constraint on the pursuit of growth is the threat of takeover, 
which is inversely related to q.  Thus, managers’ utility can be expressed as a function of the 
growth of their firms, g and q, ( ),U U g q= , where 0U g∂ ∂ > , 22 0U g <∂∂ , 0U q∂ ∂ > , 
and 22 0U q <∂∂ .11  Defining M as the amount of assets acquired through mergers, and 
setting g = g(M), we can maximize ( ),U g q  with respect to M to determine the utility 
maximizing level of growth through mergers.  This yields the following first order condition: 
 ( / )( / ) ( / )( / )U g g M U q q M∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (1) 
Since 0U g∂ ∂ > , / 0g M∂ ∂ > , and 0U q∂ ∂ > , (1) cannot be satisfied if 0q M∂ ∂ > .  For 
any merger that increases q no tradeoff between growth and security from takeovers exists.  
Growth-maximizing managers undertake all mergers that increase q.  Their behavior differs 
from managers who maximize shareholder wealth only with respect to mergers that decrease 
q.  Figure 7 depicts the relationship in eq. 1 for mergers that lower q.  When no mergers of 
this type are undertaken, q is at its maximum and the risk of takeover is minimized.  When 
the relationship between q and M yields a ( )( ) 0NU q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ > , a utility-maximizing 
manager undertakes MN of value destroying mergers. 
During stock market booms the degree of optimism in the market rises dramatically.  
As Galbraith (1961, p. 8) observed, an “indispensable element of fact” during stock market 
                                                          
10 Robin Marris (1964, 1998) was the first to posit growth as an objective for managers, and Mueller (1969) 
applied the theory to explain the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s.  For recent evidence linking 
managerial income to growth through mergers, see Khorana and Zenner (1998). 
11 A further justification for including q in the managers’ utility function would be that managers own shares in 
the firm. 
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bubbles is that individuals “build a world of speculative make-believe.  This is a world 
inhabited not by people who have to be persuaded to believe but by people who want an 
excuse to believe.”  These excuses to believe take the form of  “theories” as to why share 
prices should rise to unprecedented levels, why the economy has entered a “new era” (Shiller, 
2000, Ch. 5).  Prominent among these are “theories” about wealth increases from mergers.  
The market begins to believe that certain types of mergers – by conglomerates in the 1960s, 
media companies in the 1990s – will generate synergies and the announcement of these types 
of mergers is greeted favorably.  Managers are free to undertake such mergers without fear of 
their company’s share price taking a steep fall. 
Thus, merger announcements, that would under normal conditions result in large 
declines in acquirers’ share prices, produce only modest declines during a stock market 
boom, or even share price increases.  This shifts ( )( )U q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  to the right, as in 
Figure 7.  The firm acquires more assets through mergers, MB, since q does not drop by as 
much or perhaps even rises when a merger is announced.  Under the managerial discretion 
theory, merger waves occur during stock market booms, because the optimism prevailing in 
the market allows growth-seeking managers to undertake more wealth-destroying mergers 
than they safely can under normal conditions.  This is not the case for unlisted firms, since 
for them the takeover constraint and/or the monitoring intensity by the owners of closely-held 
companies are not affected by temporary stock market booms. 
D. The Overvalued Shares Theory  
 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) (hereafter S&V) retain the neoclassical assumption that 
managers maximize shareholders’ wealth (at least as far as the acquiring firms are 
concerned), but relax the assumptions that mergers create wealth and of capital market 
efficiency.  Some firms’ share prices become overvalued during stock market booms.  Their 
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managers know their shares are overvalued, and wish to protect their shareholders from the 
wealth loss that will come when the market lowers its estimates to their warranted levels.  
They accomplish this by exchanging their overvalued shares for the real assets of another 
company.  Targets’ managers are assumed to have short time horizons, so they too gain by 
“cashing in” their stakes in their firms at favorable terms.  Merger waves occur, because the 
number of overvalued companies increases during a stock market boom.  
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also predict merger waves during stock 
market booms, but offer a different explanation for why target managers accept overvalued 
shares.  They claim that the optimism in the market during a boom makes it difficult for 
target managers to judge whether the price of a bidder’s shares is high due to over optimism, 
or because it reflects the expected synergies from the merger, and thus they mistakenly 
become willing partners in mergers that do not generate synergies. 
 Neither version of the overvaluation theory can explain the merger activity of unlisted 
firms, however. Their shares cannot be overvalued, at least not by the stock market, and they 
cannot trade overvalued stocks for less overvalued stocks.  
III. Tests of the Theories 
The behavioral theories rest on assumptions about the optimism or over optimism in the stock 
market.  They thus predict different patterns of merger activity for companies listed on stock 
exchanges and unlisted companies.  We have already observed such differences in aggregate 
merger patterns in Section I, in this section we present additional evidence by estimating 
models of the assets acquired by individual companies.  The key prediction is that the amount 
of assets acquired by listed companies is sensitive to the aggregate P/E ratio, which we treat 
as a measure of the degree of optimism in the market, while the amount of assets acquired by 
unlisted companies does not depend on the aggregate P/E.   
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 As a second macroeconomic variable, we include the spread between the 
federal/national interest rate (Spre) (Austria, Germany, Italy, until 1998: discount rate; 
France, until 1998: main refinancing rate; Austria, Germany, France, Italy, from 1999: ECB 
main refinancing rate; UK: official bank rate; US: federal funds rate) and industrial loan rates 
(Austria, France, Germany, UK: corporate bond yield, US: commercial and industrial loan 
rate, Italy: lending interest rate).  Since unlisted companies find it harder to issue shares to 
make acquisitions, their merger activity should be more sensitive to their ability to raise 
funds by borrowing.12  We thus predict a negative coefficient on Spre, which is larger for 
unlisted than for listed companies.   
The managerial discretion theory assumes the existence of an Anglo-Saxon 
institutional structure – specifically widely dispersed share ownership.  As the fraction of 
shares held by the largest shareholder increases, the cost to him of wealth-destroying mergers 
increases.  The managerial discretion theory thus predicts a negative relationship between the 
fraction of shares held by the largest shareholder and the assets a company acquires.   
The overvaluation theory makes the opposite prediction.  The more shares the largest 
shareholder of an overvalued company has, the greater is her personal gain from trading them 
for the assets of another company.  Thus, the overvaluation theory should predict a positive 
coefficient on the largest shareholder’s shareholdings for listed companies, and a zero 
coefficient for unlisted companies, since the market places no value on them.  If we assume 
that the managers of unlisted companies might also be empire-builders, then a negative 
coefficient for the largest shareholders’ of ownership stake can also be expected.   
                                                          
12 Unlisted firms may make an IPO and/or raise funds via a capital increase from private investors. This, 
however, entails much larger transaction costs than for listed firms, thus we expect a larger sensitivity to interest 
rates for unlisted firms. 
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For a firm that overinvests, the marginal return on investment is below its neoclassical 
cost of capital.  Raising funds externally will seem more expensive than using internal cash 
flows.  Cash flows have, therefore, been a key variable in the literature for distinguishing 
between the managerial discretion and neoclassical theories of the determinants of investment 
and R&D.13  Cash flows are thus included in our model, as an additional way to discriminate 
the managerial discretion theory from the others.14 
The bigger a firm is, the more expensive it is to take it over and replace its 
management.  Thus, managers of large companies have more discretion to pursue their own 
goals and the managerial discretion theory predicts a positive coefficient on firm size.  None 
of the other theories makes a prediction for this variable, although one might also simply 
think of it as a control variable.  We also include leverage as an additional control variable. 
Since debt is one source of finance for mergers, one might predict a negative coefficient on 
debt – the higher a company’s debt, the more constrained it is in financing acquisitions by 
issuing debt.  On the other hand, high leverage may be due to past mergers and may signal a 
growth-oriented management.  This logic predicts a positive coefficient on debt. 
The basic model estimated thus looks as follows: 
 Mit = a + bP/Et  + cSpret + dSit + eCFit-1 + fln(A)it + gLevit + μit  (2) 
where Mit is the assets acquired relative to the acquirer’s total assets in year t by firm i, P/Et is 
the weighted average P/E in t, Spre is the interest rate spread in t, Sit is the fraction of 
outstanding shares held by firm i’s largest shareholder, CFit-1 is i‘s lagged cash flows, ln(A)it 
is the natural log of total assets, Levit is leverage, and μit is the error term.  Eq. 2 is estimated 
                                                          
13 See, Grabowski and Mueller (1972), Vogt (1994), Hay and Liu (1998), and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2004). 
14 To our knowledge Schwartz (1984) is the only study testing the MDH for mergers.  He does not link his 
results to merger waves, however. 
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separately for the United Kingdom and Continental Europe with separate coefficients 
estimated for each variable for listed and unlisted companies. 
Unfortunately, our data source did not provide data on acquisitions by unlisted US 
companies, so the model could only be estimated for listed firms.  We present these estimates 
for the United States for comparison purposes, although they do not allow us to discriminate 
between the different theories as well as when we have data for both types of companies.  
Since all US companies are listed, we are also able to include Tobin’s q in the equation.  The 
managerial discretion, overvaluation and q-theories all predict a positive coefficient. 
Table 4a presents the means of the variables used in the regression analysis except 
that we have presented mean total assets rather than mean log of assets, which is the variable 
in the regressions.  A –L next to a variable indicates that it is a mean for listed companies.  
An NA prior to a variable indicates a mean for non-acquiring companies, which serve as the 
control group.  The average size of an acquisition by a listed company is largest for 
Continental Europe and smallest for the UK.  Largest shareholder’s fraction of ownership is 
largest for Continental Europe and smallest for the USA.  Unsurprisingly, the largest 
shareholders of listed companies have smaller holdings than for unlisted companies.  Cash 
flows as a fraction of total assets do not vary greatly except for the USA, where acquirers’ 
cash flows average more than double those of non-acquirers.  Listed companies are generally 
bigger than unlisted companies, acquirers are bigger than non-acquirers.  Acquirers have 
higher qs than non-acquirers. 
Our models might be estimated twice, once as a probit regression to determine the 
probability that a company undertakes an acquisition, and a second time as a Tobit regression 
to take into account differences in target sizes.  Both probit and Tobit regressions were 
estimated, but only the Tobit results are reported, because they differ from the probit results 
only with respect to the sizes of the coefficients on different variables – the same variables 
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that explain whether or not a firm undertakes a merger in a particular year explain the amount 
of assets acquired.  The close similarity between the probit and Tobit results also implies that 
there was little to be gained from adopting Heckman’s (1976) two-stage estimation procedure 
for censored data. 
Table 5 presents the regression results.  In the left side of the table appear the results 
for the full sample of companies, listed and unlisted.  The numbers in the first column, 
labeled Unlisted Companies, are the coefficients on the respective variables, with t-values 
given below the coefficients for a comparison with zero.  In the second column, labeled 
Listed Differences, are the coefficients on the respective variables and t-values for a test of 
whether the coefficient for listed companies is significantly different from that for the 
unlisted companies.  The third column combines the two coefficients and gives the implied 
coefficient for the listed companies.  The numbers in this column may not always equal the 
sum of the coefficients in the other two columns, because the sum was made using estimates 
to more decimal places.  The column of numbers on the far right are estimates from 
regressions limited to acquirers and non-acquirers that were both listed companies.  The 
estimated coefficients need not equal those in the third column on the left side of the table, 
because the control group of non-acquirers differs.   
The coefficient on the weighted average P/E ratio for unlisted companies in the UK is 
-0.018 and is significant at the one per cent level.  Unlisted companies actually buy fewer 
assets through mergers when share prices are relatively high.  This may be because the prices 
of possible targets rise during a stock market boom making the purchase of other companies 
more expensive.15 The coefficient on the P/E ratio is both significantly greater for listed 
companies and positive as predicted by both the managerial and overvaluation theories.   
                                                          
15  Evidence of this for the United States is presented in Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007). 
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As expected, the coefficient on the interest rate spread is negative and much larger for 
unlisted than for listed companies.  Indeed, the implied coefficient for listed companies in the 
full sample is slightly positive.  In the regression limited to listed companies, Spre picks up a 
negative and significant coefficient, albeit one that is considerably smaller than for unlisted 
companies in the full sample.   
The shares held by the largest shareholder in the UK are negatively related to assets 
acquired with the coefficient for listed companies being roughly four times larger than for 
unlisted companies.  This result is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, but 
contradicts the overvaluation hypothesis.  If the motivation behind mergers is to trade 
overvalued shares for real assets, then one would expect large (controlling) shareholders to be 
more eager to make acquisitions, the larger their own shareholdings are.   
Cash flows, size and leverage are all positively related to assets acquired for the UK, 
with the coefficient on cash flows being twice as large for listed companies.  These results are 
consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, and suggest that in the UK leverage is 
associated with aggressive managements, which have undertaken mergers in the past.  When 
the sample is restricted to listed companies, and Tobin’s q is added, all variables retain the 
same signs as before and are significant.  Tobin’s q picks up a positive and significant 
coefficient in the sample of listed companies. 
The results for the two key variables in the model – the P/E ratio and largest 
shareholder’s holdings – are quite similar for Continental Europe.  Unlisted companies are 
less active buying other companies when share prices are high, listed companies are more 
active.  Merger activity falls as the largest shareholder’s ownership stake rises.   
The interest rate spread is again negative and much larger for unlisted than for listed 
companies with the implied coefficient for listed companies in the full sample again being 
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slightly positive.  In the regression limited to listed companies, Spre picks up a negative but 
insignificant coefficient.  
Size continues to have a positive influence on assets acquired in Continental Europe, 
but cash flows actually pick up negative coefficients, although only the coefficient for the 
listed companies is statistically significant.  Leverage has a negative and significant 
coefficient for both listed and unlisted firms with the difference between them being 
insignificant.  Thus, in Continental Europe, where access to equity markets is more limited 
than in the UK and USA, high leverage appears to inhibit acquisitions.  Finally, Tobin’s q 
again has a positive and significant coefficient when the sample is limited to listed 
companies.   
All coefficients in the US regression are statistically significant, with the sign pattern 
being consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis.  Higher cash flows and market 
optimism lead to the acquisition of more assets, while higher ownership of the largest 
shareholder reduces the amount of assets acquired.  US companies’ merger activity is much 
more sensitive to lending conditions than in either the UK or Continental Europe.   
The comparison of two point estimates illustrates the magnitude of the effects of the 
P/E ratio.  Column 1 of Table 6 shows the expected values for merger activity in our samples.  
It is denoted as E(y|x) to indicate that it is for the censored outcome.  Because we have large 
comparison groups of non-merging companies, they are not high:  0.013 per cent, 0.104 per 
cent and 2.75 per cent for Continental Europe, UK and the US, respectively.  The expected 
value for the truncated outcome, E(y|y>0,x), provides the average value of assets acquired, 
given an acquisition was undertaken.  For listed firms, the conditional expected value for 
Continental Europe is 17.3 per cent at a P/E of 15 compared to 14.0 per cent for unlisted 
firms.  The effect of a rise in the P/E ratio to 30, a reasonable number during the stock market 
boom, on listed firms is striking – the difference is almost three percentage points for listed 
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firms, whereas the expectation declines by almost one percentage point for unlisted firms.  
The same pattern can be observed for the UK and the result for the sample of listed US-firms 
is also consistent with this interpretation. 
Also in Table 6 are the partial effects of changes in P/E, ∂E(y|x)/∂(P/E).  In the Tobit 
model, they are not constant, are much higher for listed firms than for unlisted firms, and are 
largest for listed firms in a stock market boom at a P/E of 30.  The decomposition of the 
partial effects, as presented in McDonald and Moffitt (1980), shows that for listed firms the 
relative contributions of acquisition size and number of acquisitions do not change 
dramatically during stock market booms.  (For Continental Europe, the contribution of 
acquisition size increases from 10 per cent to 13 per cent, when the P/E ratio increases from 
15 to 30.)  Thus, the main explanation for merger waves is the dramatic increase in the 
number of acquisitive firms during stock market booms, not an increase in the size of 
acquisitions.  The results are similar for the UK and the US, although the fact that relatively 
more firms are above the threshold (i.e. making acquisitions) puts more weight on the change 
attributed to increases in the size of the acquisitions.  
IV. Caveats  
One possible difficulty with our estimations is that the fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder might be endogenous to companies’ merger activity.  To check for this 
we re-estimated the basic model using a lagged measure of the fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder, S.  Data for this variable are not available on an annual basis, so we used 
the most recent value of lagged S in our data set.  
Table 7 presents the results for the same regressions as run for Table 5, but with S 
replaced by lag S.  The results for lag S are similar to those for S.  In the UK and Continental 
Europe, assets acquired decline as the size of the largest shareholder’s stake in a company 
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increases, and the decline is steeper for listed than for unlisted companies.  The coefficient on 
lag S in the equation for listed companies in the USA is negative as it was for S, but now is 
insignificant.  Increasing the size of the largest shareholder’s stake in a company reduces 
agency problems and the company’s acquisition of other companies’ assets.  The effects are 
larger in the UK and Continental Europe, where the stakes of the largest shareholder are 
larger. 
Replacing S with lag S reduces the number of observations available in each sample, 
and may explain why some coefficients on the other variables change when lag S is 
substituted for S.  The basic patterns of results for the P/E ratio and cash flows remain 
unchanged, however.  In the Continental European sample, the coefficient on cash flow for 
listed firms now becomes positive as predicted, although it remains insignificantly different 
from the coefficient for unlisted firms and from zero. 
We also experimented with using lagged values of the interest rate spread.  This 
substitution had no substantive effect on the basic results. 
Our rejection of the neoclassical explanations for merger waves rests heavily on the 
assumption that unlisted companies should respond to external shocks that make mergers 
more profitable just as listed companies do.  One might object to this reasoning on the 
grounds that unlisted firms, because of their inability to access the equity market, face more 
severe financial constraints than listed companies, and thus may not be able to respond to 
external shocks that make mergers more profitable.  We do not accept this line of argument, 
however.  The tighter financial constraints that unlisted companies face might well lead them 
to undertake fewer mergers overall than listed companies.  When mergers become more 
profitable, however, they should respond as listed companies do by undertaking more 
mergers, although perhaps to lesser degree.  Returning to Table 6, we see from the E(y׀x) 
column that unlisted companies do have lower propensities to acquire assets during normal 
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times (P/E = 15).  In Continental Europe the difference in propensities is 0.234 versus 0.018, 
a multiple of 13.  In the United Kingdom, the propensity of listed companies to acquire other 
companies’ assets is 15 times greater than for unlisted firms (2.47 versus 0.16), when the P/E 
is 15.  When the P/E rises to 30, however, unlisted firms not only do not increase the volume 
of their acquisitions, they reduce it. 
V. An Illustrative Example 
A pair of recent acquisitions in Continental Europe nicely illustrate the nature of our 
results.   
Continental AG (hereafter Conti), a leading tires and auto parts producer, had a share 
price of 24 euro in mid-2004.  From that point its share price steadily rose to a high of around 
109 euro in the summer of 2007 (see Figure 8).  At that point in time it chose to acquire a 
division of Siemens specializing in auto parts including electronic systems for automobiles, 
Siemens VDO.  Conti paid 11.4 billion euro in cash for VDO, valueing it at a P/E ratio of 
around 25 (!).  At the time, Conti’s outstanding shares alone had a market value of 17.8 
billion, so the merger arguably created a company worth roughly 30 billion euro. 
On July 25, 2007, the Chairman of the Executive Board of Conti, Manfred 
Wennemer, justified the acquisition with the claims that the merged company would 
“become a market leader in certain mushrooming sectors,” that the two companies were a 
“perfect fit,” and by listing still other synergies from the merger.16  Thus, if one believed the 
Chairman of Conti’s Executive Board, the acquisition was kind of wealth-creating merger 
that fits one of the neoclassical theories.  The dramatic rise in Conti’s share price over the 
                                                          
16  Remarks made in Hanover on 25th of July, 2007.  Several numbers presented in this section are drawn from 
Wennemer’s presentation, see: 
http://www.conti-online.com/generator/www/com/de/continental/portal/themen/presse_services/acq/download/ 
praes_de.pdf.  Others are taken from public sources. 
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prior three years might be taken as an indicator of the market’s confidence in Conti’s 
management, as posited by the q-theory of mergers. 
Alternatively, the dramatic rise in Conti’s share price might be assumed to have 
greatly increased the discretion Conti’s managers had to pursue wealth-destroying mergers.  
Since VDO was not a listed company, and Conti paid for it with cash, the acquisition does 
not fit the overvaluation theory of mergers. 
As so often happens with mergers, Conti’s share price began to fall almost 
immediately after the acquisition.  By September of 2008, it had reached 50 euro – less than 
half of its value little more than a year earlier when it acquired VDO.  At this point, 
Schaeffler, a German machinery manufacturer and supplier to the automobile industry, makes 
a successful bid for Conti’s shares at 75 euros a share.  Schaeffler is an unlisted, family-
controlled firm with sales of 8.9 billion euros compared to combined Conti/VDO sales of 25 
billion euro.  Schaeffler’s purchase was made with cash.  The privately held firm, Schaeffler, 
was able to buy the combined Conti/VDO in September, 2008, for 12.15 billion euros (at a 
P/E of around 12) – less than a billion more than Conti paid for VDO alone, little more than 
one year earlier. 
These two mergers are consistent with the hypotheses put forward in this article.  
Conti, a listed company, undertakes a merger following a dramatic run-up in its share price – 
a merger which proves to be a dismal failure.  While it is still too early to judge the success 
of Schaeffler’s acquisition, it clearly acquired far more assets for its euros than did Conti, 
thus seems far more likely to prove to be a success. 
VI. Conclusions 
 Merger waves occurred in the United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe 
at the end of the 20th century.  In all three areas, the peaks of the waves coincided more or 
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less with the peaks of stock market booms.  In the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, 
the merger waves were confined exclusively to companies listed on the major stock 
exchanges.  Although a modest wave (ripple) in acquisitions by unlisted companies was 
observed in the United States, it was dwarfed by the wave in listed companies’ acquisitions, 
and was out of phase with both the stock market boom and the wave in listed company 
mergers.  These patterns are inconsistent with the neoclassical theories of merger waves that 
posit some underlying common shock to the entire economy driving a merger wave, or a set 
of simultaneous shocks to a group of industries, since such shocks should produce similar 
merger patterns for both listed and unlisted companies. 
Additional evidence in favor of the behavioral theories was found in the regression 
results.  These results were quite similar for listed companies in the United States and United 
Kingdom.  The aggregate P/E, cash flows, size, leverage and Tobin’s q all had positive and 
significant coefficients in these two countries for listed firms, while the shareholdings of the 
largest owners of the acquirers were negatively related to the amount of assets acquired.  This 
last result was also observed for Continental Europe and seems to favor the managerial 
discretion over the overvaluation hypothesis.  Growth oriented managers with large 
controlling shareholders in their companies should be less free to undertake wealth-
destroying mergers. The overvaluation hypothesis assumes that acquirers’ managers are 
trying to protect their shareholders from future declines in their companies’ share prices.  
Under this hypothesis, managers with large personal stakes in their firms should be more 
eager to make acquisitions. 
The results for Continental Europe differed in some respects from those for the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries.  Leverage does appear to be a signal of the aggressiveness of 
managers in pursuing growth in Continental Europe, and assets acquired are unrelated to cash 
flows for unlisted companies, and either negatively or unrelated for listed firms.  This latter 
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result contradicts the managerial discretion hypothesis.  On the other hand, the coefficients 
on the aggregate P/E, largest owners’ shareholdings, size and Tobin’s q are all consistent 
with the managerial discretion theory.  Thus, even for Continental Europe we think that the 
managerial discretion theory offers a better explanation for the merger wave than either of the 
two neoclassical theories or the overvaluation hypothesis.  The Conti/VDO acquisition 
certainly fits the theory. 
Despite the differences in regression results between Continental Europe and the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries, we think that the similarities across the three areas outweigh the 
differences.  Merger waves occurred in all three areas at the end of the 20th century, when 
stock markets were booming.  Managers took advantage of the optimism in the stock market 
to acquire other companies.  In all three areas, however, the enthusiasm of managers for 
mergers was dampened, if their company was not listed on a stock exchange and/or there was 
a large shareholder in the company. 
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Figure 1: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for the US 
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Figure 2: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for the UK 
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Figure 3: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for Continental Europe 
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Figure 4: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for the US 
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Figure 5: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for the UK 
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Figure 6: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for Continental 
Europe 
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Figure 7: The Managerial Trade-off 
 
 
Figure 8: Share Price of Continental AG 
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Table 1: Deals from Europe (Austria, Germany, France, Italy, UK), matched to 
Amadeus for 1991-2004, and deals from the US, matched to Global Vantage for 1991-
2002 
Deals Restriction Share Available 
Europe US  Europe US 
100,233 193,015 TFSD deal matched to Amadeus/GV 0.526 0.241
52,727 1978<= year <= June 2005 (rest: no year) 0.783 
41,268 1991<= year <= 2004 (1) 0.855 
35,290 37,867 one deal (largest) per year & company (2),(3) 0.651 0.526
22,997 19,914 deal value available 0.514 0.635
11,821 12,648 necessary financial data in Amadeus 0.631 0.839
7,457 10,612 share of largest owner available 0.430 0.241
3,207 2,560 final sample  
 
(1) Sample for US ends 2002 
(2) Europe: Yearly deals per company: min=1, max=25, average=1.53 
(3) US: Yearly deals per company: min=1, max=86, average=1.90 
TFSD: Thompson Financial Securities Data 
GV: Global Vantage Database 
 
Table 2: Domestic vs. Cross-border Mergers 
domestic cross-border 
US UK CE(1) US UK CE(1) 
1991 2991 884 1490 371 305 417
1992 3392 975 1341 443 262 362
1993 3780 1021 1054 527 280 295
1994 4495 1208 1371 634 332 407
1995 5447 1476 1349 800 395 466
1996 6140 1448 1172 964 420 409
1997 7109 1805 1089 1132 483 418
1998 8277 2087 957 1423 528 551
1999 6866 2118 1531 1218 661 869
2000 6387 2143 1969 1313 701 1087
2001 4835 1844 1401 947 584 796
2002 4535 1538 1037 671 359 480
2003 4813 1411 884 682 364 398
2004 5734 1474 1103 982 464 426
(1) CE: Continental Europe 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients between total deal values by listed acquirers and total 
deal values by not-listed acquirers 
  wave non-wave 
US: listed,not-listed 0.0597 0.8061
  (0.7629) (0.0000)
UK: listed,not-listed 0.1040 0.3972
  (0.6625) (0.0076)
Cont. Eur: listed,not-listed 0.2041 0.2329
  (0.3880) (0.1282)
 
Note: p-values in parentheses. Quarterly data was used to calculate these correlations. 
wave-period: UK and CE, 1997q1-2001q4; US, 1995q1-2002q4. 
non-wave period: UK and CE, 1989q1-1996q4 and 2002q1-2004q4; 
US, 1989q1-1994q4 and 2003q1-2004q4. 
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Table 4a: Variable Means Wave/Non-Wave 
    UK Cont.Eur. USA  
M non-wave 52.3 149.66  wave 63.43 131.97  
M-L non-wave 118.31 379.98 159.89wave 270.23 585.54 450.50
S non-wave 89.72 79.65  wave 89.88 75.93  
S-L non-wave 18.10 46.20 19.51wave 17.05 43.83 18.17
NA S non-wave 91.08 74.53  wave 88.96 73.73  
NA S-L non-wave 33.38 60.93 22.00wave 30.81 61.05 21.68
CF non-wave 0.094 0.071  wave 0.094 0.062  
CF-L non-wave 0.09 0.073 0.053wave 0.097 0.073 0.057
NA CF non-wave 0.074 0.063  wave 0.078 0.063  
NA CF-L non-wave 0.064 0.073 0.009wave 0.070 0.072 0.011
A non-wave 785.76 2655.87  wave 535.04 2706.86  
A-L non-wave 2353.15 10057.30 5426.89wave 2173.71 5339.32 8120.11
NA A non-wave 210.70 128.29  wave 210.86 101.77  
NA A-L non-wave 1152.91 1410.12 1682.34wave 875.02 655.45 2160.25
Lev non-wave 0.21 0.24  wave 0.21 0.22  
Lev-L non-wave 0.19 0.22 0.24wave 0.22 0.22 0.26
NA Lev non-wave 0.15 0.16  wave 0.14 0.15  
NA Lev-L non-wave 0.18 0.18 0.24wave 0.16 0.19 0.24
q-L non-wave 1.14 0.89 1.55wave 1.58 1.92 1.82
NA q-L non-wave 1.05 0.85 1.53wave 1.29 1.57 1.72
 
Note: Wave and non-wave periods, and variable abbreviations are explained in Table 4b. 
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Table 4b: Sample periods and variable definitions for Table 4a 
  UK Cont.Eur. US 
sample-period 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2002
wave-period 1997-2001 1997-2001 1995-2002
     
     
Variables 
M deal value (in millions USD) 
S percentage of largest shareholder 
CF cash flow over total assets (lag 1) 
A total assets (in millions USD) 
Lev leverage (= non-current liabilities / A) 
Q Tobin’s q (= (market capitalization + non-
current liabilities) / A) 
-L [Variable] for listed firms 
NA [Variable] for non-acquirers 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
 UK  UK US 
 Full Sample  Listed Firms Only 
 Unlisted Listed Listed    
 Companies Difference     
P/E -0.018 0.025 0.007 0.004 0.003 
 (-9.1) (14.4) (4.3)  (1.9) (1.7) 
Spre -0.049 0.054 0.005 -0.019 -0.191 
 (-9.2) (9.5) (1.2)  (-3.6) (-8.8) 
S -0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0034  -0.0017 -0.0005 
 (-3.3) (-9.5) (-20.0)  (-5.5) (-2.1) 
CF 0.251 0.220 0.471 0.142 0.138 
 (5.4) (3.6) (11.7)  (3.2) (5.3) 
ln(A) 0.037 -0.007 0.029 0.023 0.034 
 (13.4) (-2.3) (13.2)  (8.8) (15.8) 
Lev 0.099 0.042 0.141 0.074 0.147 
 (5.2) (1.4) (6.2)  (2.7) (6.9) 
q     0.032 0.029 
     (9.5) (10.3) 
Const.  -0.734   -0.528 -0.310 
  (-16.4)   (-8.5) (-5.2) 
Obs.  113,576   5,112 16,622 
Psd-R^2  0.4584   0.0944 0.0611 
       
 CE  CE US 
 Full Sample  Listed Firms Only 
 Unlisted Listed Listed    
 Companies Difference     
P/E -0.010 0.026 0.016  0.006 0.003 
 (-4.5) (10.2) (7.3)  (2.8) (1.7) 
Spre -0.055 0.062 0.006  -0.019 -0.191 
 (-4.1) (3.6) (0.5)  (-1.4) (-8.8) 
S -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0028  -0.0016 -0.0005 
 (-2.5) (-4.3) (-8.7)  (-4.9) (-2.1) 
CF -0.081 0.096 0.014  -0.239 0.138 
 (-0.7) (0.6) (0.1)  (-2.2) (5.3) 
ln(A) 0.132 -0.016 0.116  0.077 0.034 
 (21.4) (-2.6) (21.3)  (15.5) (15.8) 
Lev -0.113 0.016 -0.097  -0.042 0.147 
 (-2.4) (0.2) (-1.8)  (-0.9) (6.9) 
q     0.032 0.029 
     (6.1) (10.3) 
Const.  -2.468   -1.474 -0.310 
  (-24.7)   (-14.4) (-5.2) 
Obs.  198,493   5,983 16,622 
Psd-R^2  0.370   0.183 0.061 
       
Note:  t-values in parentheses.  Variables abbreviated as in Table 4b. 
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Table 6: Expected Values and Marginal Effects 
 
E(y|x) E(y|y>0,x) ∂E(y|x) ∂(P/E) 
McDonald-Moffitt decomp. 
at: 
increased 
size of  acq. 
increased 
number of acq. 
Cont. Eur.  
means 0.013 13.67  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 0.234 17.31 0.021 10.3 89.7
means,P/E=30, listed=1 0.840 20.09 0.066 13.2 86.8
means,P/E=15, listed=0 0.018 13.99 -0.001 -7.1 -92.9
means,P/E=30, listed=0 0.006 12.99 -0.0005 -6.2 -93.8
UK  
means 0.104 10.98  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 2.47 16.80 0.106 19.3 80.7
means,P/E=30, listed=1 4.52 19.11 0.171 23.5 76.5
means,P/E=15, listed=0 0.164 11.49 -0.025 -10.4 -89.6
means,P/E=30, listed=0 0.013 9.23 -0.0024 -7.1 -92.9
US  
means 2.75 18.26  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 2.51 17.93 0.074 19.0 81.0
means,P/E=30, listed=1 3.24 18.86 0.107 20.5 79.5
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Table 7: Regression Results with Shareholder Lagged by one Year 
 UK  UK US 
 Full Sample  Listed Firms Only 
 Unlisted Listed Listed    
 Companies Difference     
P/E -0.018 0.026 0.008  0.005 0.006 
 (-8.4) (13.8) (4.4)  (2.6) (5.2) 
Spre -0.050 0.047 -0.003  -0.018 -0.186 
 (-8.6) (7.3) (-0.7)  (-3.4) (-8.4) 
S-Lag -0.0005 -0.0029 -0.0034  -0.0015 -0.0003 
 (-1.8) (-9.2) (-17.9)  (-4.8) (-1.1) 
CF 0.265 0.220 0.485  0.152 0.185 
 (5.2) (3.3) (11.1)  (3.4) (6.8) 
ln(A) 0.037 -0.007 0.030  0.024 0.034 
 (12.5) (-2.0) (12.5)  (9.0) (16.4) 
Lev 0.095 0.048 0.143  0.056 0.158 
 (4.6) (1.5) (5.9)  (2.1) (7.7) 
q     0.033 0.030 
     (9.6) (10.8) 
Const.  -0.768   -0.565 -0.396 
  (-15.8)   (-9.3) (-7.5) 
Obs.  97,987   5,033 16,901 
Psd-R^2  0.450   0.097 0.073 
       
 CE  CE US 
 Full Sample  Listed Firms Only 
 Unlisted Listed Listed    
 Companies Difference     
P/E -0.008 0.024 0.015  0.008 0.006 
 (-3.4) (8.5) (6.6)  (3.5) (5.2) 
Spre -0.059 0.059 0.000  -0.017 -0.186 
 (-3.7) (3.0) (0.0)  (-1.3) (-8.4) 
S-Lag -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0025  -0.0015 -0.0003 
 (-3.0) (-2.8) (-7.2)  (-4.5) (-1.1) 
CF -0.113 0.262 0.149  -0.213 0.185 
 (-0.9) (1.4) (1.1)  (-1.9) (6.8) 
ln(A) 0.137 -0.015 0.123  0.079 0.034 
 (20.1) (-2.2) (20.4)  (15.4) (16.4) 
Lev -0.131 0.058 -0.073  -0.034 0.158 
 (-2.6) (0.8) (-1.3)  (-0.7) (7.7) 
q     0.033 0.030 
     (6.1) (10.8) 
Const.  -2.557   -1.550 -0.396 
  (-23.5)   (-14.4) (-7.5) 
Obs.  171,016   5,663 16,901 
Psd-R^2  0.374   0.201 0.073 
       
Note:  t-values below coefficients.  Variables abbreviated as in Table 4b. 
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Using Matching to Evaluate Mergers 
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I. Introduction 
It is often criticised that merger effects studies use comparison groups which do not 
capture well what the prospects of the merging firm would have been in absence of the 
merger. At the heart of this lies what is sometimes called a “missing data problem”: we can 
naturally not observe a firm making a merger (or acquisition) and not making it at the same 
time. A choice must be made then how the comparison group is constructed. In a traditional 
regression framework all firms where data is available will usually qualify to form the control 
group. But not all firms are similar to merging firms with respect to the relevant 
characteristics. Although having many observations is desirable from the viewpoint of 
statistical efficiency, it can have the disadvantage of being sensitive to the functional form 
assumptions imposed on the estimated relationship if there are many control observations that 
are very different from the merging firms. One possible solution to this problem of severe 
differences of many control observations is to block on certain characteristics (covariates): for 
example one can group the data by centiles of firm size, or by industries, and estimate the 
relationship for every group, and average over them to find the average merger effect over all 
mergers. Some poorly suiting control observations may then drop automatically. Doing this, 
though, will give rise to the “curse of dimensionality” even with few variables to block on. 
This curse arises with the problem that the pool of control firms is always exhausted quickly 
when the data are divided along several dimensions. Propensity score matching provides a 
tool to avoid the curse of dimensionality in the construction of a control group. We will 
describe and discuss the framework used in the next Section. Additionally, we shortly refer to 
the use of traditional methods to estimate the merger effect. Section III describes the variables 
used in the estimations. The comparison of different methods permits to judge whether 
propensity score matching has a large impact on the estimation of the effect. Presentation of 
the results follows in Section IV, and certain robustness checks are discussed in Section V. 
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II. Methods and Framework 
First, a description of the statistical framework that is applied to implement the 
propensity score is provided, together with some linkages to those methods used for 
comparison. We draw on Imbens (2004) and Wooldridge (2002) to introduce the framework: 
The framework is frequently referred to as the “Rubin causal model of inference”, a label 
attached by Holland (1986), who summarises the model. 
A. Statistical Model 
A sample of N units is randomly drawn from the population of firms. There are two 
potential outcomes of the variable of interest, which here will be profitability, measured as 
return on assets, by which the effect of the merger is measured. In such a framework of 
potential outcomes the event for which the effect is measured is usually called the 
“treatment”, and its effect straightforwardly is referred to as the “treatment effect”. Therefore, 
we use “merger”, “merger or acquisition” and “treatment” synonymously. For each unit (firm) 
i there are two potential outcomes according to treatment status being either treated, which is 
denoted by Wi=1, or not treated, denoted by Wi=0. Potential outcome Y is therefore a function 
of individual treatment status: Yi(Wi). Yi(0) is the value of the outcome if the firm makes no 
merger, and Yi(1) is the value of the outcome when unit i does make a merger. Eventually, 
every firm i will only experience Wi=1 or Wi=0 exclusively, but in the causal model the effect 
of the merger is defined against its latent counterpart, which is Yi(1-Wi). Moreover, each unit 
is described by a vector Xi of firm characteristics, usually termed “covariates” in this 
literature. Therefore, for every i the triple (Xi, Wi, Yi) is observed, where Yi is the realised 
outcome. 
One important measure of interest is the average difference in outcomes between 
treated and untreated units for the whole population of firms, τP, called the population average 
treatment effect and defined as 
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 τP = E(Y(1) - Y(0)). 
The sample analogue is the sample average treatment effect and is calculated as 
߬ௌ ൌ ෍ሺ ୧ܻሺ1ሻ െ Y୧ሺ0ሻሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
. 
Looking only at the treated units, the population average treatment effect for the treated is 
߬௉,் ൌ Eሺܻሺ1ሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ|ܹ ൌ 1ሻ. 
Its sample analogue is the focus of interest here: 
1
∑ ௜ܹே௜ୀଵ
෍ ௜ܹ൫ ௜ܻሺ1ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ൯.
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
How can estimates of these be obtained? When treatment is statistically independent 
of the outcome, as usually achieved by randomised assignment of treatment in controlled 
experiments, then it holds that 
E൫ܻሺ1ሻ൯ ൌ Eሺܻ|ܹ ൌ 1ሻ. 
This means that the expected value of those that receive treatment is identical to what the 
expected outcome would be for any unit in the population. Analogously, this holds for the 
untreated: 
E൫ܻሺ0ሻ൯ ൌ Eሺܻ|ܹ ൌ 0ሻ. 
Therefore one can consistently estimate E൫ܻሺ0ሻ൯ and E൫ܻሺ1ሻ൯ by the means of the respective 
sample subgroups and obtain an estimate for the population difference by the difference in the 
two means. Moreover, because treatment status and outcome are independent, the expected 
differences for the treated and untreated are the same: 
Eሺܻሺ1ሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ|ܹ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ E൫ܻሺ1ሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ൯. 
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Mergers are not randomly assigned. Although one can choose a random sample of 
firms that make mergers and firms that do not, they self-select into the two groups dependent 
on the idiosyncratic outcome pair ൫ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ, ௜ܻሺ1ሻ൯  they expect. These latent outcome pairs are 
different because firms are different with respect to observable and potentially also to 
unobservable characteristics. The following assumption, which is crucial for identification 
under self selection, is introduced: 
 Conditional on X, W and ൫ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ, ௜ܻሺ1ሻ൯ are independent. (1) 
This means that a rich set of observable characteristics that possibly influence the potential 
outcome is crucial. Moreover, merging and non-merging firms must have the same 
distributions concerning their unobserved characteristics. 
Several different labels are used for assumption (1) in economics and statistics: 
ignorability of treatment given X, ignorable treatment design, conditional independence 
assumption, selection on observables, unconfoundedness (Imbens, 2004, Wooldridge, 2002). 
With this assumption made, estimation within a simple regression framework can be 
implemented, estimating 
 E൫ܻሺܹሻ൯ ൌ ߛܹ ൅ ߙ ൅ ܺߚ. (2) 
This is a standard way to estimate the treatment effect γ except that identification is explicitly 
secured by the introduction of the conditional independence assumption. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show that alternatively to conditioning on X it is sufficient to condition on the 
probability of treatment, called the propensity score, p(X), in order to remove bias due to all 
covariates X under assumption (1). The propensity score is defined as 
݌ሺܺሻ ൌ Prሺܹ ൌ 1|ܺሻ, 
and their central theorem in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, Theorem 1), is 
 Conditional on p(X), W and X are independent. (3) 
When estimated by a linear probability model, the regression 
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E൫ܻሺܹሻ൯ ൌ ߛܹ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߚ଴݌ሺܺሻ. 
will yield the same estimate for γ as regression (2). So the propensity score summarises all the 
information about the merger determinants contained in X. 
Together with the assumption 
 0<p(X)<1, (4) 
the expected difference between two observations with different treatment but the same 
propensity score equals the average treatment effect: 
Eሺܻሺ1ሻ|݌ሺܺሻ, ܹ ൌ 1ሻ െ Eሺܻሺ0ሻ|݌ሺܺሻ, ܹ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ E൫ܻሺ1ሻ െ ܻሺ0ሻ൯. 
Given this, the aim is to find control observations the same (“very similar”) propensity 
scores as the treated units, and that observations have to fulfill assumption (4), which means 
that for every observation with characteristics X=x, the probability of treatment must be 
positive, and must not be certain. Otherwise, there could not be a unit from the opposite group 
with the same characteristics. 
B. Implementation, Robustness 
Implementation consists of the following steps: 
1. Choose determinants: All variables that influence the merger decision should be included. 
The next Section is devoted to a discussion about which variables are used as determinants. 
2. Estimate the propensity score: A Logit model is used to estimate the propensity score for 
the full sample. 
3. Check overlap: Merging firms with propensity scores above that of all non-merging firms 
are excluded. Due to a lack of comparison units with the same propensity score, the merger 
effect cannot be estimated for those. 
4. Matching: While there are many different matching algorithms to control for the 
propensity score of treated and control units, results typically do not vary widely, and we only 
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apply one-to-one matching based on the closest control unit with respect to each treated unit’s 
propensity score. 
5. Check balancing property: One central aspect of the appropriateness of a particular 
matching algorithm must be that the conditional independence assumption holds in the 
matched sample. The assumption states, in other words, that the distribution of Y(0) must be 
the same conditional on W=0 and X=x as its distribution conditional on W=1 and X=x. 
Analogously, the two conditional distributions must be the same for Y(1). To check if the 
covariate (marginal) distributions of generated control compared to comparison group can be 
considered “close enough”, plots of the Kernel density estimates of the distribution functions 
are examined. This is not sufficient to detect inequalities in the joint distributions of X, but it 
is a necessary implication of Rosenbaum and Rubin's theorem, equation (3) above. To have a 
measure of when closeness of empirical distributions is reached we could use, for example, a 
t-test of group means and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of population distributions. 
But as Imai, King and Stuart (2008) point out, this does not make sense. It is not the goal of 
the “test” to check if two samples (the two groups) come from the same population; the goal 
is to balance the covariate distributions in the sample, and hypothesis tests are irrelevant. 
Even if the X distributions are close enough to conclude that the two samples come from the 
same population, the differences could be too large for an influential variable.1 
III. Determinants and Effects of Mergers 
A. Determinants of Mergers 
Many different hypotheses about the determinants of mergers have been formulated, 
and the model should not be constrained to a single one. Therefore, variables are included that 
                                                 
1 Another undesirable property of using test statistics highlighted in Imai, King and Stuart (2008) by examining 
the behaviour of the t-test when the number of observations decreases in the treatment group is not of concern 
here, because in one-to-one matching and with a fixed number of treated, the sizes of the groups do not change. 
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influence the merger decision based on different objectives and assumptions. Doing so, we 
will follow some of the strategies in Gugler, Mueller and Weichselbaumer (2008). 
A wave-like pattern is typical for merger activity over time. Our data encompasses the 
period 1992 to 2003 and therefore also a merger wave. The aim of this article is not to explain 
why there are waves explicitly. Merger waves may have determinants that differ strongly 
from other merger determinant explanations. An easy way to account for the wave pattern is 
the inclusion of a linear and a quadratic time trend in the estimation of the determinants. 
One aspect of recent merger waves theories that is taken into account explicitly is the 
association with the stock market, and stock market booms. This may be associated with 
economic fundamentals (as in the q-theory formulated by Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), or 
may be due to overvaluation (as in the model of stock market driven acquisitions by Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003) or driven by the exploitation of market optimism by managers (as in the 
approach by Gugler et al., 2008). All predict strong differences for listed firms and non-listed 
firms. Therefore, a dummy variable is included to differentiate between the two groups of 
listed and non-listed. 
Corporate governance structures play a potential role for more than one reason. When 
ownership is not concentrated and monitoring difficult, management’s goals are worse 
aligned with that of shareholders and there is more room for discretionary behaviour. For 
managers, creating a larger firm by a merger is desirable even if it decreases profitability. 
Therefore, the ownership share of the largest shareholder is included and expected to decrease 
merger activity of firms, given that mergers are bad for profitability but pursued by poorly 
monitored managers (i.e., no large owner). 
Besides that, shareholder protection differs between countries or legal systems. 
Findings indicate that Anglo-American legal systems have better protection (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) and this could influence the merger decision, either 
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positively if mergers are expected to be profitable, or negatively if mergers are expected to be 
harmful. Thus, an indicator for legal system is employed, differentiating between Continental 
Europe, and Great Britain, which represents the Anglo-Saxon legal origin. 
Cash flow is an important variable in the managerial discretion hypothesis. For cash 
flow, discretionary use is easiest for the management. On the other hand, lagged profitability 
should also have a place in the covariates. From the perspective of the q-theory or neo-
classical theories more generally, higher profitability can indicate higher ability of the 
management, which could increase merger propensity of profit oriented managers when 
poorly managed firms exist. Complementary, low profitability should have a negative effect 
as a merger determinant as for these firms it may be harder to finance the transaction when 
they have to rely on external sources, and when management already has below-average 
success with the own firm. Concerning cash flow and profitability, a problem arising is that 
they are highly correlated. So only profitability is used. Nevertheless, due to the high 
correlation, it still functions as a control for the determinants associated with cash flow. 
The size of the company can be a control variable for many reasons. Possibilities are 
easier access to finance, e.g. when the company is too big to fail, or through an internal capital 
market when it has several subsidiaries. Given that it is more difficult to acquire a target the 
larger it is, larger firms can choose from a larger pool of accessible targets. For the same 
reason, managerial discretion can be larger, because the large firm is less likely to be taken 
over. Besides total assets, the number of employees is controlled for. This is a straight-
forward alternative size measure when firms vary in capital-intensity and labour-intensity. 
Debt is another control variable which may serve as a channel of influencing the 
merger decision for more than one reason. A high debt level may indicate that it is more 
difficult to get additional loans. Opposed to that, it could also mean that a company is growth-
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oriented and more willing to make mergers. Lastly, the age of the firm also serves as a control 
variable.  
B. Effects of Mergers 
Given the efficient market hypothesis, using an event study with stock returns is an 
appealing strategy to measure the effects of mergers. We do not want to exclude non-listed 
firms for which there is no stock market data. It would exclude a large share of acquisitions, 
and it would preclude judgement over the question whether the two groups, listed and non-
listed, can be compared at all within our propensity score matching framework. 
Instead, balance sheet data is used to calculate the return on assets (ROA), given as 
total assets over after-tax profits. The evaluation is measured by ROA from one year after the 
merger until four years after the merger. The effect is measured for each year, and ROA then 
cumulated for all years. So the outcome measure one year after the merger is ROAt+1, give a 
merger in t. For the second year, we look at (ROAt+1+ROAt+2), and so on. The year of the 
merger is not considered and left as a consolidation period. As our sample shows, many firms 
make more than one M&A within our sample period. Firm-years of merging firms are 
excluded where another merger happens in the evaluation year. So when an M&A occurs in t, 
and no further M&A in t+1, then ROA of t+1 of a firm is included in the treatment group. The 
same strategy applies to all four periods after the merger. 
C. Data 
The information on mergers comes from “Worldwide Mergers \& Acquisitions,” 
published by Thomson Financial Securities Data (TFSD). It includes all corporate 
transactions with a transaction (deal) value of at least one million US dollars. Public and 
private transactions are covered. The following countries have been selected: Austria, 
Germany, Italy, France and United Kingdom. 
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It was necessary to combine the transactions with the financial data available from the 
Amadeus database from Bureau van Dijk. An approximate string matching algorithm was 
applied, matching via company names for each country. All of the automatic matches below a 
certain similarity threshold were checked manually. 52.6 per cent of all transactions could be 
matched to an Amadeus company. Data restrictions reduced the sample available for 
estimation considerably. Besides the financial data, the information on the largest shareholder 
from Amadeus is used when available. 
IV. Methods Applied 
The methods that are used for obtaining the estimated effect of a merger, and 
compared, are: (A) simple difference in means (DIM), (B) ordinary least squares (OLS), (C) 
propensity score estimation and matching. For each method balance checks for the covariates 
of the treatment and control group for the elicited sample are presented. 
A. Difference in Means 
Having data from random sampling at hand where the variable of interest is assigned 
randomly, one could obtain a valid estimate of this variable’s effect by just comparing the 
difference in means. This is not plausible, given that the merger decision is not made at 
random but is a deliberate action of the management. But it is useful as a comparison to what 
is gained by the more complex estimators and to point out where the problem lies by 
examining the empirical distributions for the variables selected. 
In the first four rows of results in Table 1 the t-tests results are presented for the 
difference in means between merging and non-merging firm-years of ROA, cumulative over 
the respective number of years after the merger. A significant and negative effect of 0.7 
percentage point is found for the first year, increases by about half a percentage point in year 
two, but very little further in year three, where the cumulative estimated effect is insignificant. 
51
In year four, a further increase of almost one percentage point below the average of the 
control group is measured, amounting to a total negative cumulative effect after four years of 
2.3 percentage points, which is marginally insignificant. 
But looking at the Kernel densities of the selected covariates for the two groups, it 
becomes clear that merging firms differ markedly from the control group. These variables are: 
ln(TA) is the log of total assets and ln(Emp) log of the number of employees, Sh.1 the size of 
the largest shareholder, firm age is years since incorporation, leverage is long term debt over 
total assets, Listed and GB are dummy variables for being listed on a stock exchange and 
being British, respectively, ROA stands for the lag of the outcome measure. It must be 
emphasised that all variables that vary over time are lagged by one period to avoid the 
influence of the merger on those variables. Figure 1 shows that in its left-hand-sides: merging 
firms are larger both in terms of total assets and the number of employees, have more largest 
shareholders at lower levels but lower densities starting at fifty percent ownership, and have 
higher pre-merger ROA than control firms. Merging firms are also a little older and a bit more 
leveraged, but the differences look less pronounced. Figure 2 shows the discrepancy of the 
two groups for the binary variables: more are from Great Britain (i.e. Anglo-Saxon legal 
background) and a higher share is listed. Besides that, an Amadeus peculiarity is that many 
firms have only unconsolidated data, and this fraction is larger for non-listed firms. Table 2 
confirms this for the sample means and standard deviations of the two groups (columns 
“merger”, compared to the “DIM, OLS”-column of the control columns). 
B. OLS 
OLS is the most common and obvious extension to the potentially flawed difference in 
means estimate. The following specification is made to account for the differences in 
variables that influence profitability: 
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ܴܱܣ௜,௧ା௞ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅ ܾଶ ln൫ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܾଷ ln൫ܧ݉݌௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܾସ݄ܵ. 1௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ܾହܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ଺ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ଻ܩܤ௜ ൅ ଼ܾܮ݅ݏݐ݁݀௜ ൅ ܾଽܥ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݁݀௜
൅ ܾଵ଴,௝ܵܫܥ௜,௝ ൅ ݑ௜,௧ 
Merger is a dummy variable that captures the effect of a M&A in t on ROA in t+k, 
k=1,2,3,4. SIC stands for a full set of two-digit SIC-code-dummy variables, where dummy-
variable SICi,j is one if firm i is in industry j. The second set of four rows of Table 1 show the 
merger effect estimated: starting at 94 basis points, it is about 30 percent higher for the years 
t+1 to t+3. In t+4, it is only slightly higher than the simple difference-in-means estimate, but 
now significant. So by making regression adjustments, all the estimates become significant 
and are now larger. Table 3 shows the results for all coefficients in the four OLS regressions. 
Balancing Property: To improve comparability between the three methods, all observations 
where data for the some of the covariates were missing for the OLS estimations have been 
excluded from the DIM-estimation. Therefore, the left-hand-sides of Figure 1 and Figure 2 
also represent the OLS-sample. This illustrates, that, as far as the marginal distributions are 
concerned, there are differences in the two groups which can give rise to sensitivity to the 
specification. The differences in means and standard deviations of the covariates are also 
given by columns four and five (Control: DIM, OLS) in Table 2. 
C. Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching is intended to obtain balance on the covariates without 
having to block on every single covariate. As described in Section II, under the assumption of 
conditional independence, controlling for the propensity score will achieve this. First, we 
estimate the propensity score with a Logit-model with the specification: 
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Pr൫ ௜ܹ,௧ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵ ln൫ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܿଶ ln൫ܧ݉݌௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܿଷ݄ܵ. 1௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܿସܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ܿହܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܿ଺ܩܤ௜ ൅ ܿ଻ܮ݅ݏݐ݁݀௜ ൅ ଼ܿܥ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݁݀௜ ൅ ܿଽܣ݃݁௜
൅ ܿଵ଴ݐ ൅ ܿଵଵݐଶ ൅ ݒ௜,௧ 
The left-hand-side is the probability of a merger, which is modelled. On the right-
hand-side are a constant, the log of total assets, the log of the number of employees, the 
ownership share of the largest shareholder, ROA from before the merger, leverage, a dummy 
for being a British firm, another dummy for firm i being listed on a stock exchange, and one 
for consolidated data form, age is a firm’s age in terms of years since incorporation, a trend 
variable t which is set to 1 in 1991, and a quadratic time trend, t2. 
Table 4 contains the estimates for this equation. Based on that, predicted probabilities 
of treatment can be obtained both for controls and for the actually treated. It must be checked 
if all merging firms can be matched to control firms with a similar propensity score. A simple 
rule is applied to identify the common support region, where matches can be found: all 
treatment units above the highest and below the lowest estimated propensity score of controls 
are discarded. Both conditions are fulfilled for all merging firms: the estimated propensities 
lie in the interval [0.0016, 5625] for the merging firms and this is a subset of the range 
[0.0003, 0.5927] of the control firms. Therefore all observations can be used in the matching 
algorithm. The left panel of Figure 3 shows the empirical densities of the estimated scores. 
Based on these estimated treatment probabilities, every treated firm is matched to one 
control firm with the most similar imputed value. This is done by matching with replacement 
from the pool of control firms. The treatment effect is obtained by calculating the difference 
in mean outcome between the two groups. The final four rows of Table 1 show the results: 
now the estimated effect is higher for all four periods, and is significant for the first three and 
marginally insignificant for the fourth post-merger year. Whereas the difference is not so 
large in the first post-merger year, the effect is one third larger with propensity score 
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matching in the second period, and almost 60 percent larger in year three. This strategy to find 
a careful balance between control and treated based on the determinants for the merger 
changes the estimate of the effect decisively. 
Balancing Property: Conditioning on the empirical propensity score does not guarantee that 
the covariates are balanced in the matched sample. But Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the 
balance is very well established with respect to the samples’ (empirical) marginal 
distributions. Means and standard deviations given in Table 2 confirm this. Moreover, the 
empirical distributions of the propensity scores in the matched sample (right panel of Figure 
3) seem almost identical in comparison to the whole sample (left panel of Figure 3). 
V. Robustness Checks 
Several points can be raised against the validity of the way that propensity score 
matching is implemented here. Three of them that seem important and can be well examined 
are addressed in the robustness checks of this section: blocking on the industry classification; 
treatment effect estimation on lagged outcome, where one predicts from the statistical 
framework adopted that the effect of a merger must disappear if we look at a period before the 
merger; and a flexible estimation of the propensity score, to see how strongly the effect 
estimated depends on the functional form of the determinants equation. 
A. Blocking on Industries 
A check for robustness can be done by looking at each industry separately to find a 
control firm. Even with a large pool of control variables it is difficult to end up with balance 
of matched and control over all industries automatically, that is without strict matching on 
industries. Therefore, we match exactly on the industry of the merging firm, implying balance 
of industries represented both in treated and control. Only control firms in the same industry 
qualify for being a nearest neighbour, in terms of propensity score. 
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In lines 2 to 5 of Table 5 it is shown that the effects for each year lie somewhere in 
between the OLS and matching estimates of Table 1: year 1 is very close to Table 1 and 
significant; years 2 and 3 are not significant anymore, but year 4, while smaller than before, is 
significant and still very large with 3.1 percent cumulative difference. 
B. Lagged Outcome 
Does the change in ROA really come from the merger? The connection between cause 
and effect becomes more credible after checking if a treatment effect is also found when one 
looks at outcome before the treatment (Imbens, 2004). In this check, merging firms and their 
matched controls are evaluated by looking at a time period before the merger, where, given 
the assumptions, it is clear that there cannot be a merger effect, that is, the estimates before 
the merger took place should be zero. Otherwise, it cannot be argued that those characteristics 
responsible for the negative effect have been controlled for. 
Line 3 of Table 5 shows a negative, but insignificant estimate for the difference of 
ROA in t-2 and t-1 between firms that make a merger in t and the control group. It is also 
insignificant for t-2 and t-3, once positive and once negative. Taken together, there is no 
pattern and no significance in the differences between the two groups before the merger takes 
place in the merger group, and thus is evidence on the usefulness of our interpretation of the 
merger effect. 
C. Flexible Estimation of the Propensity Score 
When the set of characteristics that should be controlled for to estimate the propensity 
score is correct but there is uncertainty what the correct specification for the Logit is, it is 
important to see how sensitive the results are to the specification of the Logit. This is done by 
including all interactions between the variables and all quadratic terms of the variables. 
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The last set of four lines in Table 5 contains the result. For all years except the second, 
the effect is larger now. Similarly to blocking on the industry, only the first and the fourth 
year’s estimate is significant, but as compared to the lagged outcome test, the second and third 
year are not having very small t-values, and the pattern of consistently negative effects after 
the merger is remaining. From this perspective, the estimates in Table 1 do not seem very 
sensitive to the specification of the Logit estimation. 
VI. Conclusion 
Merger effects are often estimated to be negative, but the result is disputed. Critics 
argue that the group of merging firms is inherently different from non-merging firms and this 
raises questions about the validity of such an incorrect sample of controls even after 
controlling for the covariates in a regression. 
Our analysis shows that for our set of determinant variables for mergers, the group of 
merging firms actually does differ strongly. Accepting that a regression-type adjustment for 
these differences may not suffice, we construct a control group by estimating and matching on 
the propensity score. Evidence is found that a nearest-neighbour matching algorithm actually 
balances the samples with respect to their distributions. 
The results exhibit a clear pattern of increasingly negative post-merger cumulative 
ROA when compared to the matched control group. This pattern is robust to blocking on 
industries and a flexible estimation of the propensity score, as well as in passing a lagged 
outcome test. There is also a tendency that the negative effect of mergers is more negative 
when estimated after matching as compared to a simple difference in means and OLS-control 
of the covariates. This is especially true for the first and last year evaluated in our sample. 
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Table 1: Estimates of Cumulative ROA Effect after a Merger 
Coeff. t-value Mergers Controls 
DIM t+1 -0.0072 (-2.6) 1,693 198,927 
t+2 -0.0122 (-2.3) 1,264 154,254 
t+3 -0.0137 (-1.6) 934 117,082 
t+4 -0.0230 (-1.9) 668 87,521 
OLS t+1 -0.0094 (-3.7) 1,693 198,927 
t+2 -0.0154 (-3.2) 1,264 154,254 
t+3 -0.0185 (-2.5) 934 117,082 
t+4 -0.0259 (-2.4) 668 87,521 
PS-Match.1,2 t+1 -0.0108 (-3.4) 1,693 1,637 
t+2 -0.0209 (-2.6) 1,264 1,233 
t+3 -0.0294 (-3.4) 934 913 
t+4 -0.0404 (-1.9) 668 652 
1t-value from bootstraped standard error, obtained by the procedure described in Becker and 
Ichino (2002). 
2The matched control sample used for inference consists of a number of controls equal to 
that of mergers. A deviation of controls and mergers in this table means that some controls 
have been assigned to more than one  merging firm. 
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Table 2: Sample Means of Determinant Variables 
Mergers Control 
DIM, OLS PSM 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Ln(TA) 11.382 1.64 10.253 1.40 11.393 1.73 
Ln(Emp) 5.976 1.68 4.932 1.44 5.929 1.67 
Sh. 1 68.960 33.74 78.443 26.40 71.064 32.44 
ROA 0.050 0.11 0.036 0.10 0.048 0.09 
Age 42.172 28.57 36.756 22.90 44.254 31.25 
GB 0.546 0.50 0.343 0.48 0.580 0.49 
Listed 0.310 0.46 0.021 0.14 0.305 0.46 
Leverage 0.161 0.19 0.137 0.18 0.158 0.19 
n 1,693 198,927 1,693 
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Table 3: OLS Merger Effects Estimation (Dep. Var.: ROAi,t+k, k=1,2,3,4) 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Merger -0.0094 -0.0154 -0.0185 -0.0259 
(-3.7) (-3.2) (-2.5) (-2.4) 
ln(TA) -0.0018 -0.0044 -0.0072 -0.0112 
(-8.0) (-10.6) (-11.2) (-12.1) 
ln(Emp) -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0019 
(-2.6) (-2.3) (-2.4) (-2.2) 
Sh.1 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00004 
(2.2) (1.2) (0.7) (0.9) 
ROA 0.4592 0.8433 1.1915 1.5079 
(201.0) (191.2) (168.0) (144.0) 
Leverage -0.0087 -0.0208 -0.0344 -0.0463 
(-6.3) (-7.9) (-8.2) (-7.6) 
GB 0.0054 0.0139 0.0227 0.0347 
(9.8) (13.8) (14.4) (15.4) 
Listed -0.0015 0.0028 0.0105 0.0139 
(-0.9) (0.9) (2.4) (2.2) 
Consolidated -0.0078 -0.0184 -0.0316 -0.0453 
(-8.2) (-10.3) (-11.3) (-11.3) 
Constant 0.0352 0.0830 0.1373 0.2035 
(17.9) (22.8) (24.3) (25.1) 
F-test: SIC-2  11.1 14.4 16.4 16.6 
N 200,620  155,518 118,016 88,189 
R2 0.185 0.216 0.225 0.229 
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Table 4: Logit Merger Determinants Estimation (Dep. Var.: Pr ሺ ௜ܹ,௧ ൌ 1ሻ) 
Coeff. z-value 
ln(TA) 0.158 (8.2)
ln(Emp) 0.147 (8.0)
Sh.1 -0.002 (-2.1)
ROA 1.133 (4.6)
Leverage -0.057 (-0.4)
GB 0.542 (10.0)
Listed 2.293 (29.1)
Consolidated 0.394 (5.6)
Age -0.002 (-2.2)
Year 0.317 (3.8)
Year2 -0.017 (-4.1)
Constant -8.936 (-21.0)
N 200,620 
Psd.-R2 0.134
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Table 5: Estimates of Merger Effect from PS-Matching for Robustness Checks 
Coeff. t-value Mergers Controls 
SIC-2 t+1 -0.0106 (-2.3) 1,667 1,580 
t+2 -0.0197 (-1.6) 1,246 1,187 
t+3 -0.0210 (-1.6) 923 882 
t+4 -0.0313 (-2.2) 661 631 
Lagged t-1 -0.0040 (-0.7) 1,749 1,666 
Outcome t-2 0.0020 (0.4) 1,348 1,283 
t-3 -0.0038 (-1.2) 999 962 
Flexible t+1 -0.0122 (-2.2) 1,693 1,617 
PS-Estimation t+2 -0.0193 (-1.6) 1,264 1,222 
t+3 -0.0323 (-1.6) 934 907 
t+4 -0.0502 (-2.1) 668 649 
All t-values are from bootstraped standard error (see Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
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Figure 1a-1f: Kernel Densities of the Continuous Covariates, Full Sample (left) vs. Matched 
Sample (“PSM”, right) 
Figure 1a: Log of Size (TA, Total Assets) 
 
Figure 1b: Log of the Number of Employees 
 
Figure 1c: Size of the Largest Shareholder 
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Figure 1d: Return on Assets 
 
Figure 1e: Firm Age 
 
Figure 1f: Leverage 
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Figure 2a-2c: Histograms of the Binary Covariates, Full Sample (left) vs. Matched Sample 
(“PSM”, right) 
Figure 2a: Fraction of British Firms (GB) 
 
Figure 2b: Fraction of Listed Firms 
 
Figure 2c: Fraction of Consolidated Firms 
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Figure 3: Kernel Densities of the Estimated Propensity Score, Full Sample (left) vs. Matched 
Sample (“PSM”, right) 
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The Effects of Mergers in the Current Economic Crisis 
Co-author: Klaus Gugler 
68
1. Introduction 
There is an ongoing controversy as to the effects of mergers on acquirers in the 
economic literature. Most balance sheet ex post and long run event studies find negative 
effects on acquirers and/or their targets, while most short run event studies find positive 
effects for the combined value. For example, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for the United 
States conclude that the profitability of acquired firms declined after they were acquired. 
Gugler et al. (2003) attribute most gains if any to market power effects. On the other hand, 
Healy et al. (1992) found a significant increase in the pre-tax cash flows of the companies 
involved in the 50 largest mergers between 1979 and 1984. Concerning stock price 
performance, Moeller et al. (2005) find that acquiring-firm shareholders lost 12 cents around 
acquisition announcements per dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion 
from 1998 through 2001. Most wealth losses are incurred by large merger deals. More 
generally, Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) conclude that long-run performance is negative following 
mergers, though performance is non-negative (and perhaps even positive) following tender 
offers, and cash-financed mergers do better than stock-financed mergers (see also Loughran 
and Vijh, 1997). In contrast, Andrade et al. (2001) find that over their 1973 to 1998 sample 
period, the announcement-period stock market response to mergers is positive for the 
combined merging parties, suggesting that mergers create value on behalf of shareholders. 
 This paper tries to clarify the issue whether mergers completed in the years before the 
current economic crisis created value or contributed to its severity. The current giant 
economic crisis – somewhat cynically – provides a unique testing ground for economists. For 
sure, the events in the years 2007-2009 can be regarded as exogenous to merger investment 
decisions in the years 2006 and before. Although some economists warned of the bubbly 
nature of asset prices (e.g. house prices: Robert J. Shiller) before the crisis unfolded, financial 
markets in 2006 or earlier did not foresee the collapse of subprime mortgage markets in early 
69
2007,1 nor the bank run on Northern Rock, a British bank, in mid-September 2007, nor the 
fire sale of Bear Stearns in March 2008 to JPMorgan Chase to avoid bankruptcy, nor the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 12, 2008, nor the bail out of American 
International Group (AIG), etc., etc.2 Indeed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed above 
14,000 for the first time in its history on July 19, 2007, half a year after the mortgage crisis 
began! 
This paper utilizes the current crisis to get a truly (to the merger decision) exogenous 
ex post measure of performance: the share price drop of the acquiring firm during the 
economic crisis. We define two measures (1) the percentage share price drop from 1 January 
2007 until end of March 2009 (“2007-Model”) and (2) a post Lehman drop from 15 
September 2008 until end of March 2009 (“Lehman-Model”). We put together a unique 
database of more than 20,000 mergers worldwide since 2002. For both measures we find that 
mergers completed in the five years before the onset of the crisis significantly exacerbated the 
share price drop of a company in the crisis. Stock-financed mergers also destroyed value but 
fared better than cash-financed mergers, and mergers in the financial sector are worse than 
mergers in the non-financial sector.  Firms from the Anglo-Saxon legal system and firms from 
countries with a low anti-self dealing index were harder hit than other firms. Our results are 
robust to the inclusion of leverage as an explanatory variable. Thus mergers by creating less 
efficient corporate organisations than before had a - distinct from leverage - negative effect on 
the share price performance of acquiring companies in the crisis. 
Many culprits of the current crisis were named by politicians and economists mostly 
concerning macro regulation, such as lenient financial regulation and lax monetary policy. 
While we believe that these are valid points, our results point to another, hitherto neglected, 
                                                 
1 In February 2007, HSBC, one of the world’s largest banks, wrote down its holdings of subprime-related MBS 
(mortgage backed securities) by $10.5 billion, the first major subprime related loss to be reported.   
2 For an early account of the crisis see Brunnermeier (2008).  
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weakness in our economic system, one of securities laws and micro regulation, namely bad 
corporate governance.  Corporate control of managers of large public corporations suffers 
from severe shortcomings and resulting bad merger decisions exacerbated the current crisis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data base. 
Section 3 presents our main regressions, and Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Data 
Our dataset was formed by combining the Mergers and Acquistions database SDC 
Platinum with Datastream, both from Thomson Reuters. M&As included in the regressions 
are for the years 2002 to 2007. Eighty percent of the 32,987 transactions with deal value 
available could be matched to 11,369 different acquiring firms in Datastream. Thus, on 
average acquiring firms made 2.9 acquisitions in that period. These consist of six different 
forms of M&A: full mergers (26%), acquisitions of assets (39%), of partial interest (16%), of 
majority interest (12%), of remaining interest (6%), and of certain assets (1%).  The 
remaining, non-merging Datastream firms form the comparison group. We correct each firm's 
share price series for re-investment of dividends and stock splits. After taking into account all 
data availability restrictions, the final sample consists of 25,697 non-merging firms and 9,932 
merging firms. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the variables used in the regressions (for the 
variable descriptions, see Table 1). As can be seen in Panel A, on average share prices 
dropped by 35% post 2007 and 29% post Lehman, and merging firms experienced much 
larger losses in value than non-merging firms, 43% versus 31% post 2007 (35% versus 27% 
post Lehman). Figure 1 visualizes the share price performance since 1 January 2007 until end 
of March 2009 for merging firms versus non-merging firms. The wedge in performance of 
merging versus non-merging firms opened quite early after the onset of the crisis, and 
regained momentum after the Lehman collapse (see red vertical line). Financial firms as well 
71
as firms from Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal systems were particularly hard hit. Panel 
B of table 2 reports the increase in merger activity in the years before the crisis: while in 2002 
only 0.8% of own market value was taken over on average calculated over all firms (12.5% 
taking only merging firm years), these numbers go up to 3.1% (27.1%) in 2007.  Financial 
firms display more stable merger activity, with 17%-19% of own market value taken over in 
the years under consideration. Around a third of merger expenditures is financed using own 
stock. 
3. Results 
The rationale of our regression analysis is as follows. If mergers create value for 
shareholders on average, e.g. via economies of scale or scope but also via increased market 
power, merging firms should fare better during the economic crisis than non-merging firms. If 
they in contrast result in less efficient organisations, e.g. because motives behind mergers are 
not only driven by shareholder value maximization objectives, the reverse should hold. 
Importantly, we control whenever possible (see below) for leverage: if mergers mainly 
increase the leverage of companies, it may be this increased leverage in the crisis than drives 
our results and not the mergers. 
Tables 3a and 3b present our main results. We regress the share price drop variables 
(D-2007 and D-Lehman) on a run-up variable in share prices until 2006 and until Lehman  (R-
2007 and R-Lehman) to capture mean reversion of share prices, size measured by market 
value, and yearly merger activity variables from 2002 until 2006 (“2007-Model”) or 2007 
(“Lehman-Model”). In Table 3a we additionally include a full set of ICB-Subsector3 and 
country dummies. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) sparked a large literature on the effects of 
country level shareholder rights and legal systems on the performance of companies. In short, 
their hypothesis is that the Anglo-Saxon legal system is more protective of shareholders than 
                                                 
3 Industry Classification Benchmark of Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE, http://www.icbenchmark.com. 
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other legal systems, such as the Germanic or French legal system. Therefore, in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 3b we include instead of the country dummies the anti-self dealing index of 
Djankov et al. (2008) measuring country level shareholder rights as well as three legal system 
dummies in addition to the constant term, which measures the Anglo-Saxon average effect. In 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3b we include leverage as an additional explanatory variable.4 As 
said, one point of critique may be that mergers simply proxy for firm leverage, and it is 
mainly leverage and not mergers that drives down share prices in the face of a near shut down 
in external capital markets, e.g. because of the increased cash constraints or even bankruptcy 
risk associated with leverage. We report the results on pre-crisis long term debt over total 
assets, results for total debt (long term plus short term debt over total assets) are similar but 
weaker.  
As can be seen, all merger related coefficients are negative: mergers before the onset 
of the crisis significantly worsened the share price collapse during 2007-2009. Effects are 
particularly severe for the 2007-Model, but are also present in the Lehman-Model. 
Reassuringly, the effects taper off as we move further and further back in time: more recent 
mergers in 2006/2007 had a worse effect on share price performance during 2007-2009 than 
mergers in 2002/2003. The line ØAA at the bottom of the table measures the average effect 
over the five years of merger activity. The economic effects are substantial: for example, the 
coefficient of -0.188 (Table 3b, column 2) implies that share prices would have dropped by 5 
percentage points less, had acquiring firms not made a merger pre-crisis, i.e. had they reduced 
their merger activity by 27 percentage points. 
Our results are not driven by mergers simply increasing the leverage of acquiring 
firms. While the leverage variables take on the expected negative signs, thus exacerbating 
share price drops in the crisis, the results on mergers are not affected (see columns 3 and 4). 
                                                 
4 We do not include leverage in all regressions, since we lose one third of the observations (mainly the financial 
firms such as banks and insurance companies), if we include leverage variables. 
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Interestingly, the coefficient on leverage becomes particularly negative and significant in the 
Lehman-model, when the financial crisis dramatically exacerbated. 
The table’s other results are also worth mentioning: while the run-up and market value 
variables do not bring consistent results, firms in countries with better shareholder protection 
as measured by the anti-self dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) did better during the crisis. 
Finally, Anglo-Saxon firms did worse than firms from other legal systems. Thus, it appears 
that shareholder rights are better directly measured as by the anti self-dealing index than by 
legal systems. 
Tables 4a and 4b dig deeper into the question which mergers were particularly 
detrimental to crisis performance. It disentangles stock-financed mergers from cash-financed 
mergers (Table 4a), and mergers by financial firms from non-financial firms (Table 4b). 
Looking at the average effects at the bottom of the table, stock mergers did better than cash 
mergers and financial firm mergers did worse than non-financial firm mergers (the latter 
particularly so post-Lehman!). The first result, which is contrary to most findings in the 
literature, may be explained by the larger need to take on debt in a cash merger than in a stock 
merger, since some of the cash usually comes from issuing debt, and during the crisis 
leveraged firms were particularly severely punished. The latter result may be explained by the 
fact that the crisis originated in the financial sector, in part because of bad merger decisions. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper utilizes the current economic crisis to assess which effects mergers had on 
acquiring firms and whether bad mergers contributed to the severity of the crisis. We find 
strong evidence that mergers exacerbated the share price declines of firms in the crisis, thus 
aggravating it. We propose – besides more prudent macro regulation – more prudent micro 
regulation, particularly in corporate governance.  
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Figure 1: Total Return Index, Merging vs. Non-Merging Firms, from 1 January 2007 until end 
of March 2009 
.6
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
01jan2007 01jan2008 15sep2008 01mar2009
Non-Merging Firms
Merging Firms
 
Note: The vertical red line denotes the Lehman collapse 
 
Table 1: Variable Explanations 
TRI Total Return Index from Datastream, firm-specific 
D % change in TRI, starting from 12 Sept. 2008 in the “Lehman-Model” (D-Lehman), and from 1 Jan. 
2007 in the “2007-Model” (D-2007), until 24 Mar. 2009 
R Run-up of TRI, % change of TRI from 1 Jan. 2006 to 12 Sep. 2008 in the “Lehman-Model” (R-
Lehman), and to 31 Dec. 2006 in the “2007-Model” (R-2007) 
MV Market Value in Billion USD on 12 Sep. 2008 in the “Lehman-Model”, and on 1 Jan. 2007 in the 
“2007-Model” 
Lev Non-Current Liablities over Total Assets 
AA Acquired Assets, in % of MV 
AA St AA financed by stock 
AA Fin AA by firms in the financial industry 
ASDI Anti-Self-Dealing Index (Djankov et al., 2008) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A All firms Merging firms Non-merging firms 
  mean median mean median mean median 
D-Lehman -.29 -.32 -.35 -.38 -.27 -.29 
D-2007 -.35 -.47 -.43 -.53 -.31 -.45 
R-Lehman .13 -.09 .06 -.12 .16 -.08 
R-2007 .26 .10 .25 .13 .27 .09 
MV 1.34 .07 3.21 .22 .61 .05 
Lev .19 .12 .22 .18 .17 .10 
N 35,629 9,932 25,697 
       
Panel B: Acquired Assets for All and Merging Firms, % Stock Financed and Mergers of 
Financial Firms 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AA All firms .008 .007 .013 .019 .026 .031 
AA Merging firms .125 .113 .154 .198 .235 .271 
 % of AA Stock-financed .332 .276 .287 .297 .275 .273 
AA Financial firms .006 .006 .012 .016 .021 .027 
AA Financial merging firms .129 .130 .175 .206 .242 .293 
 
 
Table 3a: Regression Results 
  Lehman   2007   
R -.0015 -.0406*** 
 (-.88) (-9.85) 
MV .0004 .0002 
 (1.70) (.49) 
AA 02  -.066 
  (-1.16) 
AA 03 -.011 -.021 
 (-.44) (-.36) 
AA 04 -.067*** -.138*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.49) 
AA 05 -.065*** -.173*** 
 (-4.53) (-5.19) 
AA 06 -.082*** -.225*** 
 (-6.96) (-7.14) 
AA 07 -.080***  
 (-7.62)  
Constant -.194 -.141 
  (-1.11)  (-.45)  
Ø AA  -.061*** -.125*** 
  (-9.12)  (-6.47)  
Country, Industry Y  Y  
R-squared .271 .177 
N 31789  35075  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
 
78
Table 3b: Regression Results 
  Lehman   2007   Lehman   2007   
R .0172*** -.0038 .0196*** .0013 
 (9.82) (-.89) (1.03) (.27) 
MV .0002 -.0005 .0009*** .0009 
 (1.05) (-1.24) (3.68) (1.92) 
AA 02  -.143*  -.108 
  (-2.37)  (-1.67) 
AA 03 -.017 -.073 .011 -.064 
 (-.65) (-1.17) (.40) (-.95) 
AA 04 -.067*** -.169*** -.056** -.129 ** 
 (-3.49) (-4.03) (-2.65) (-2.65) 
AA 05 -.086*** -.237*** -.063*** -.18 *** 
 (-5.64) (-6.66) (-3.88) (-4.69) 
AA 06 -.107*** -.316*** -.093*** -.264 *** 
 (-8.44) (-9.47) (-6.95) (-7.50) 
AA 07 -.102***  -.091***  
 (-9.07)  (-7.54)  
ASDI .582*** .710*** .625*** .865 *** 
 (44.28) (27.77) (42.79) -3.08 
French .255*** .506*** .271*** .539 *** 
 (33.51) (35.33) (31.05) (32.26) 
German .362*** .341*** .387*** .418 *** 
 (71.64) (33.97) (68.74) (36.75) 
Scandinavian .213*** .160*** .245*** .258 *** 
 (17.09) (6.39) (17.56) (9.25) 
Lev   -.082*** -.010 
   (-8.05) (-.50) 
Constant -.782*** -.899*** -.813*** -1.052 *** 
  (-79.37)  (-46.99)  (-69.86)  (-45.79)  
Ø AA -.076*** -.188*** -.058*** -.149 *** 
  (-1.73)  (-9.25)  (-7.61)  (-6.74)  
Country, Industry N  N  N  N  
R-squared .156 .053 .194 .071 
N 31583  34826  24086  24800  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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Table 4a: Regression Results, Stock Acquisitions 
  Lehman  2007  
R .0197*** .0014 
 (-1.09) -.28 
MV .0009*** .0009 
 (3.64) (1.91) 
AA 02 N-St  -.145 
  (-1.64) 
AA 03 N-St -.0146 -.074 
 (-.41) (-.86) 
AA 04 N-St -.0396 -.137* 
 (-1.55) (-2.09) 
AA 05 N-St -.0796*** -.194*** 
 (-3.84) (-4.00) 
AA 06 N-St -.1137*** -.267*** 
 (-7.02) (-6.29) 
AA 07 N-St -.1059***  
 (-7.25)  
AA 02 St  -.068 
  (-.67) 
AA 03 St .022 -.043 
 (.48) (-.36) 
AA 04 St -.034 -.115* 
 (-.84) (-1.29) 
AA 05 St -.030 -.145* 
 (-1.07) (-2.15) 
AA 06 St -.031 -.229*** 
 (-1.18) (-3.32) 
AA 07 St -.029  
 (-1.21)  
ASDI .626*** .866*** 
 (42.87) (3.1) 
French .272*** .539*** 
 (31.16) (32.28) 
German .387*** .418*** 
 (68.85) (36.76) 
Scandinavian .243*** .258*** 
 (17.61) (9.25) 
Lev -.0789*** -.009 
 (-7.72) (-.44) 
Constant -.814*** -1.052*** 
  (-7.01)  (-45.82)  
Ø AAN- St -.071*** -.163*** 
 (-7.39) (-5.64) 
Ø AA St -.020 -.120*** 
 (-1.38) (-3.02) 
Diff. Ø AA .050*** .043 
  (2.66)  (.83)  
R-squared .194 .071 
N 24110  24804  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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Table 4b: Regression Results, Financial Firms 
  Lehman   2007   
R .0173*** -.0036 
 (9.88) (-.85) 
MV .0002 -.0005 
 (-1.10) (-1.23) 
AA 02 N-Fin  -.159* 
  (-2.46) 
AA 03 N-Fin .015 -.036 
 (.53) (-.51) 
AA 04 N-Fin -.056 -.173*** 
 (-2.63) (-3.74) 
AA 05 N-Fin -.067*** -.224*** 
 (-4.04) (-5.86) 
AA 06 N-Fin -.094*** -.303*** 
 (-6.87) (-8.39) 
AA 07 N-Fin -.094***  
 (-7.58)  
AA 02 Fin  -.035 
  (-.20) 
AA 03 Fin -.119 -.219 
 (-2.02) (-1.59) 
AA 04 Fin -.110 -.141 
 (-2.46) (-1.42) 
AA 05 Fin -.180*** -.307** 
 (-4.79) (-3.26) 
AA 06 Fin -.172*** -.388*** 
 (-5.33) (-4.52) 
AA 07 Fin -.131***  
 (-5.09)  
ASDI .582*** .710*** 
 (44.28) (27.76) 
French .255*** .506*** 
 (33.53) (35.33) 
German .361*** .341*** 
 (71.60) (33.95) 
Scandinavian .213*** .160*** 
 (17.10) (6.39) 
Constant -.781*** -.898*** 
  (-79.39)  (-46.98)  
Ø AA N-Fin -.143*** -.218*** 
 (-9.44) (-4.45) 
Ø AA Fin -.059*** -.179*** 
 (-7.52) (-8.06) 
Diff. Ø AA -.083*** -.039 
  (-4.96)  (-.73)  
R-squared .157 .053 
N 31583  34826  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three articles, which are concerned with three different 
investigations about mergers and acquisitions using empirical methods. Corresponding to that, 
each of the three paragraphs below summarises one of the articles. 
One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are 
correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to 
discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by 
examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If “real” changes in the economy 
drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted 
firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted 
firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves. 
It is often criticised that M&A effects studies use comparison groups which capture 
poorly what the prospects of the acquiring firm would have been absent the merger. Finding 
firms similar to merging firms with respect to characteristics relevant for the merger decision 
would be desirable, but suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”. We present in this paper a 
choice of comparable non-merging firms based on the propensity score, which reduces the 
problem of matching treatment to control units to proximity on this one-dimensional scale. 
These refined estimates for merger evaluation are also compared to OLS estimates. Our 
results show that merger effects remain as strongly negative as estimated with OLS, even 
when only a control group of one percent is selected based on the propensity score. 
We put together a unique database of more than 20,000 mergers worldwide since 2002 
and estimate their effects on the share price drop of firms during the current economic crisis. 
Mergers of the five years before the onset of the crisis significantly exacerbated this drop, 
stock-financed mergers also destroyed value but fared better than cash-financed mergers, and 
mergers in the financial sector are worse than mergers in the non-financial sector. Firms from 
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the Anglo-Saxon legal system and firms from countries with a low anti-self dealing index 
were harder hit than other firms.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Artikeln, die drei verschiedene Fragestellungen 
zum Thema „Fusionen und Übernahmen“ mit empirischen Methoden behandelt. Dem 
entsprechend stehen die drei nachstehenden Absätze für die Zusammenfassung jeweils eines 
der Artikel. 
Eines der auffälligsten Merkmale von Fusionen ist die Beobachtung, dass sie in 
Wellen stattfinden und mit einem Anstieg der Aktienpreise und der Preis-Gewinn-
Verhältnisse korrelieren. Um zwischen direkten Ursachen des Aktienmarktes auf die 
Entscheidungen die Firmen betreffend und anderen Einflüssen zu unterscheiden untersuchen 
wir börsennotierte und nicht notierte Unternehmen als zwei verschiedene Gruppen. Wenn, 
wie von manchen neoklassischen Fusionstheorie vorhergesagt wird, Fusionswellen von realen 
wirtschaftlichen Veränderungen ausgelöst werden, dann sollten sowohl börsennotierte als 
auch nicht börsennotierte Firmen eine parallele Intensivierung der Fusionstätigkeit 
durchlaufen. Im Widerspruch dazu lassen sich deutliche Unterschiede zwischen den beiden 
Firmengruppen entdecken wie sie von verhaltensorientierten Theorien vorhergesagt werden. 
Häufig wird an Studien über die Effekte von Fusionen und Übernahmen (F&Ü) 
kritisiert, dass die Vergleichsgruppe, die notwendig ist, um den Effekt identifizieren zu 
können, eine schlechte Abbildung dafür darstellt, wie es der übernehmenden Firma ohne der 
Transaktion ergangen wäre. Am besten wäre es, Vergleichsfirmen ohne F&Ü zu finden, die 
den übernehmenden Firmen hinsichtlich der für die Transaktion relevanten Charakteristika 
möglichst ähnlich sind. Allerdings ist das bei mehreren Dimensionen von Charakteristika und 
mit zunehmender Firmenanzahl nur mit unrealistisch großen Stichprobenumfängen („Curse of 
Dimensionality“). In diesem Artikel wird die Auswahl von vergleichbaren Firmen ohne F&Ü 
mittels der (geschätzten) Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine Transaktion durchzuführen („Propensity 
Score“) beschrieben. Dadurch reduziert sich die Verbindung von Kontrollgruppenfirmen mit 
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den übernehmenden Firmen auf eine einzelne Dimension. Beim Vergleich mit der Einfachen 
Kleinste-Quardrate-Methode („OLS“) zeigt sich, dass das Muster von durch die F&Ü negativ 
beeinflusste Profitabilität nicht nur erhalten bleibt sondern sogar stärker negativ geschätzt 
wird. Dieses Ergebnis ist robust gegenüber alternativen Implementierungen der Propensity 
Score. 
Aus Basis eines Datensatzes mit über 20.000 Fusionen und Übernahmen (F&Ü) 
weltweit seit 2002 schätzen wir ihren Effekt auf das Absinken der Aktienkurse während der 
Wirtschaftskrise. F&Ü der fünf Jahre vor der Krise verschlimmern den Aktienkursverlust 
signifikant. Dies trifft auch bei Aktien-finanzierten F&Ü zu, aber in schwächerem Maße als 
auf Barmittel-finanzierte F&Ü. Weiters haben F&Ü im Finanzsektor einen stärkeren 
negativen Einfluß auf die Aktienkursentwicklung in der Krise. Die Aktienkurse von Firmen 
mit angelsächsischem Rechtssystem und solche von Ländern mit einem niedrigen „Anti-Self-
Dealing-Index“ verloren stärker als andere Firmen. 
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